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Kueta has been written about the role of the Supply
Corps officer as an Inventory manager, and many treatises have
been written on Inventory management Improvement devices.
However, most of these writings concern the Inventory manager
ashore— the Inventory manager who worfcs with large quantities
of material in an Impersonal manner. His functions ae an
inventory manager afloat, as the Supply Officer of a combatant
ship of the United states ^avy, have been largely neglected.
It is In this capacity where he controls the material on the
last stage of its Journey from produoer to end user, and it is
in this capacity that he determines the requirements that, In
the long run, determine the decisions made by his counterparts
ashore.
The number and complexity of problems facing the
afloat inventory manager may be less Imposing than those
plaguing supply managers ashore, but their solution is just as
critical to the achievement of the operational readiness of the
fleet. 1 On board destroyers, in particular, the job of the
1 A. J. lens, "Atlantic Destroyers ;>o SIM," Monthly
Newsletter-- a^aslne of the aavy Supply Corps . Vol. QCV, Ho, 3
(varoh, 1962), p. 23.

Supply Officer has alwaya been among the toughest and most
challenging to which a Supply Corps officer can be assigned.
The "greyhound" Navy is one of long and arduous hours required
by the imposition of demanding standards of operational
effectiveness and performance.
The sailing ships of Nelson's day were much more
capable of casting off their dependence on land support than
were World War II battleships. The increasing dependence of
ships on fuels limited their ability to spend long periods
away from land and increased the need for logistic planning and
facilities. As ship designs improved and logistic facilities
became waterborne, the requirement for far-flung coaling
stations developed and navies once again became more dependent
upon home-ports within the confines of their national
boundaries. However, during World War II, the United States
Navy was able to keep the carrier task force of the Fifth
Fleet at sea for seventy-nine days through the use of tranafer-
at-sea replenishment techniques. This tremendous
accomplishment had not been anticipated nor even thought
possible at the beginning of hostilities. It was t plan
developed to fit the needs of the times. This and other
experiences of the war formed a firm foundation for the current
operational doctrines of our deployed forces In the
Mediterranean and western Pacific operating areas. The effort
that is required to keep these fleets mobile has advanced Navy

logistics to a position never before obtained. 1 An important
aspect of this effort has been the development of shipboard
inventories to meet the repair requirements of the highly
complicated, sophisticated equipments Installed in the ships.
Today's destroyer supply officer, for example, faces a
challenge unknown to his predeeeesors—that of inventory
raanagement of some 17,000 line items of repair parts valued at
nearly a quarter of a million dollars, and having an
immeasurable impact on the operational readiness of his ship,
the Inventory management of repair parte has become bis
business for Supply Corps officers at sea. The quantity,
value, and importance of the repair parts items now aboard
destroyer-type ships equals or exceeds that of tforld War II
light cruisers. 2 A guided missile frigate such as the USS
Coonta (DLCJ-9) carries an inventory of 36,000 items worth
#500,000, comparable to a wartime battleship. The management
of these inventories is usually accompanied by inadequate
personnel, both as to numbers and training for this exacting
Job, therefore requiring a higher degree of personal management
by the Supply Offleer . It is necessary for him to develop
procedures which will allow him to delegate his authority with
the assurance of obtaining the effectiveness for fulfillment
* o.f . . R.G. Iverson et al . "The Growth of a Rational
System Approach to Naval Repair Parts Inventories: The
Introduction of • ilitary Essentiality" (unpublished research
report, School of Government, Business and International
Affairs, The George Washington University, Washington, Q*C. t
January, 1962), pp. 3-4.
2Lenz, loc. cit .

of hia responsibilities.
At the same time that the role of naval logistics has
become more complicated and important to the operation of our
fleets, new developments have taken place In the operations of
this nation's business community. As an outgrowth of Frederick
*. Taylor's scientific management approach at the beginning of
the century has developed the field of the Management Sciences*
Personnel studying applications of this branch of economic
learning, primarily the operations research types, have found
many areas for improvement of inventory control techniques in
the business environment. Although many of the new techniques
have been in existence for years, tliey have not been implemented
very rapidly, and In fact, not much attention was given to them
until after the second <orld War. These techniques have been
adopted by the military inventory management systems for
application to the colossal inventories which support our armed
forces, wider application is possible.
It is the thesis of this paper that these scientific
inventory techniques are universal In application, and that the
main reason they have not found wider acceptance is that they
have been couched in mathematical terms, not readily
understandable by the average business manager, be he military
or civilian. This paper is an attempt to synthesize the
scientific inventory management techniques which have been
developed into a format that the Supply Officer of one of our
Navy men-of-war can use to manage his inventories more
effectively; a format or technique that he can use to assure

5himself of a rational systematic approach to hie whole inventory
in order to meet hie responsibilities for the operational
effectiveness of his ship. Although certain standard procedures
and requirements must be met, each ship has a different problem
requiring individual Initiative on the part of the shipboard
Supply Officer. 1
To convey an understanding of the applications of these
techniques this paper makes an analogy of civilian or business
inventories to military Inventories in general and to shipboard
inventories in particular, similarly, the concept of scientific
inventory management is developed from a business environment
and applied to the military environment. Underlying all of our
decisions Is the constraint of the amount of money available to
effect those decisions. This is universal.
^Personal interview with Commander W, 1, ^oodard,
Assistant* Director, Fleet Operations Division, Bureau of





Any dlaousalon of Inventory management should start with
an examination of the purpose for maintaining inventories,
because generally most Inventories are looked upon as a
necessary evil—as something to be kept to a minimum with a
minimus investment of funds. The questions businessmen raise in
connection with management and control of inventories are
basically aimed at action, not at arriving at answers. The
questions are stated, unsurprisingly, In the characteristic
tenas of decisions to be made: e.g., where shall we maintain
how much stock? However, action questions are not enough by
themselves. In order to get at the answers to these questions
as a basis for taking action, it is necessary to back off and
ask some rather different kinds of quest ions s tfhy do we have
inventories? What affects the inventory balances we maintain?
How do these effects tafce place? Prom these questions, a
picture of the inventory problem can be built up, which shows
the influence on inventories and costs of the various
alternative decisions which management ffiay ultimately want to
consider.
'
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1 J.P. ^Sagee, "Guides to Inventory Policy," Harvard
business Kevlew Statistical decision gerles ( Cam brIdge , !-.ass .
:
Harvard University Press, 195?) » p. 160.

An inventory la a stock: of goods held or atored for the
purpose of future sale or production* 1 They constitute an
alternative to production or procurement In the future* To have
available one unit of product tomorrow, we may either produce
(or purchase) It then, or produce (or purchase) it today and
store it until tomorrow. The choice between the two procedures
depends upon their relative profitability, 2 Inventories go
further, however, and that is to buy time, and to decouple
successive stages of production and distribution. They give the
manager flexibility in his operations between one stage and the
next, and reduce the interdependence of the different stages,
tfhen there is a perfect synchronisation between receipts and
production, and between production and sales, it may be possible
to get along without Inventories of raw materials and finished
goods. But even If such perfect synchronization were possible,
It is likely that it would be uneconomical.
3
In the military the reasons for carry ins inventories are
similar. In a sense, time or a reduction in the interdependence
of the echelons of the distribution system is being bought here
too, but available funds are used also to buy more ready time
for weapons systems instead of us ins th« same funds to buy more





% h,jory fit Inventory and product jon, ( xitaaford
,
Calif,: Stanford University Press, 1953), p. 18.
2lWf, P. 19.
3t.M. Vhitin, ?he Theory .of, Inventory ^aRsment
(Princeton, N.J.t Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 84,

weapons or equipments. The purpose of any military supply
system Is to provide those spare parts and supplies required to
maintain the equipments and personnel necessary for the
performance of assigned missions, on the other hand, from
Congress and other agencies reviewing budgets, there is an
eisphaals on conservation of available fund© by keeping inventory
levels as low as possible.
The question before inventory managers, tnen, is* How
bi® should inventories be? The answer to this is obvious—they
should be just big enough. But what is big enough? This
question is made more difficult by the fact that each individual
within a management group tends to think of inventories in
isolation from other operations. In a civilian environment,
the sales manager commonly says that the company must never reake
a customer wait; the production mana&er ©ays there must be long
manufacturing runs for lower costs and steady employment; the
treasurer says that large inventories are draining off cash
which could be used to make a profit. 3ueh situations occur
all the time. Tft® task of all production planning, scheduling,
or control functions, in fact, is to balance conflicting
objectives such as those of minimum purchase or production cost,
minimum inventory investment, minimum storage and distribution
cost, and itsaxiiaum service to customers.* This in itself poses
problems, for it lo impossible to choose that policy which
simultaneously maximises gain and minimises cost, because there
1Magee, log^nfe, > P. 159.

9is no such policy—maximum gain is infinitely large, and
minimum coat is zero. 1
This same parochial ism of viewpoints occurs within the
military environment: the iiBsile Officer wants hie parts
"now" ; the shore-based Controller says that funds for
inventories are limited, In addition, there is the very real
factor of operational readiness of the foroes to perform their
assigned missions, as the frame of reference In which service to
the customer is evaluated. If the equipments needed to perform
the various missions are out of commission for lack of parts,
the operational readiness is certainly adversely affected.
However, it is obvious that it is economically impossible to
stock all Items which might be required in all places where they
might be needed, which policy would be necessary for the
customers to have all their requirements satisfied immediately
all the time*
EOTpqBjMfta ftf jnyen^pnea
An examination of the composition of inventories should
be made with the definition of their purpose in mind. There
are many different types of businesses with different materials,
but their inventories can be categorized into five groups; 2
materials inventory, purchased parts inventory, supplies
inventory, work in process, and finished goods inventory.
*C»J« Hitch and R,H. :c ean, The Kconqialca of defense
In the Nuclear A%e (Cambridge, :ass,: Harvard University Press,
1960), p. 165.
2R.N. Owens, Kanamement of Industrial Enterprises
(Homewood, 111.: R.P. Irwin, Inc., 1953), p. 535.
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Materials inventory is the stock of items which become
part of the product manufactured. This category ia sometisses
called the raw materials inventory.
Purchased parts are fabricated items which are bought
from other manufacturers in a finished or seail-flnished state.
ipplies include those items which are used in
manufacturing or associated processes, hut are not a part of
the product. Examples are rags, stationery, cleaning supplies,
etc* These are handled In a separate category, because their
costs are not assignable to a particular product, and are
therefore considered a part of the plant overhead.
Work in process is the partially completed product in
the factory in the process of manufacture, and is sometimes
referred to as the "faotory float."
Finished goods are the manufactured products in the form
in which they will be sold to the customers.
While these categories are derived fros an industrial
source, they can be applied to any business, although they would
not necessarily be expressed in the same terms, in a
manufacturing business, the materials inventory, purchased parts
inventory, and supplies inventory are combined in various mixes
in the work In process stage, and are produced as the finished
goods. It can be seen that in this particular frame of
reference inventories are utilised to decouple the various
stages of production and Bake theta ©ore independent of each
other. Once the finished goods are produced they may be
utilized in a similar manner to decouple the distribution
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process from the factory to the consumer.
vhile the problems of a retail business differ froa
those of a manufacturing establishment, the techniques of
inventory management, aa well as the problems, are similar.
In the military services inventories consist of
technical repair parts t common-use supplies; and functional
goods, such as subsistence stocks, resale merchandise, petroleum
products, medical supplies, etc*
Technical repair parts, by far the majority of Items in
the military supply systems, are those parts used to repair
equipments in use in a military service, Most technical repair
parts are peculiar to one equipment, although most manufacturers
try to use their own parts in designing their own equipments,
and a duplication is found in different equipments by the same
manufacturer. There are also certain common-use items, such as
electron tubes, that are universally used.*
wommon-use supplies are general supplies not
identifiable to a particular equipment, including the categories
described in the civilian supplies inventory above. Certain
common-use hardware, such as packing, gaskets, tools, etc., are
included.
For the purpose of this paper technical repair parts and
general supplies are separated from the other commodities as a
subject of discussion. While they are all managed by similar
techniques, the first two constitute the biggest problem from a
f
..--. , _^,^__ , »_ ^-^ ^ -_., . . -.. . ., , ,
r TTT
..
( 1| mr | ^^ ]f |riM|||) , lu jr- - tn LJ _ jj Lll u
*&£?, > iverson, sk^U» loo. JUaj pp. 6-13.
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management point of view, particularly to the sea-going
inventory manager. In the Navy alone they constitute the
largest number of items— 1.2 million—as well as being the
classes of items with widest application in terms of different
ships or activities using the material. This does not minimize
the importance of the other materials to the mission of the
servloes, but they represent a small number of Items susceptible
to more precise manipulation than the hardware type material}
for example, their requirements can be determined on the basis
of number of flying or steaming hours, or the number of people
on board.
Distribution ^yafreq
It is not enough to say that business or the services
have inventories to decouple stages of manufacture or to buy
time. It is necessary to examine the systems for distribution
of inventories to provide the service to the customer.
Business enterprises maintain inventories at the plant,
at wholesale warehouses, and on retail shelves. These all may
or may not be under one control or ownership, but until the
goods are bought by the final consumer, they are distributed
through this particular network. Although the particular
struoture will vary with the size of the company, volume of
sales, or area of distribution of the product, it will
generally follow the pattern described. The more numerous and
varied are the echelons of inventory, the more complicated
becomes the problm of inventory management. This aggregation
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of activities introduces problems of redistributing assets
between stocking activities, which is also an expensive
proposition. 1 Efi this respect, the element of time required to
move inventories from one echelon to another is a prime
consideration, and one that partially determines the number of
echelons required, but also, as Forrester points out, this time
element has a multiplying effect on usage, causing
disproportionate stock levels at higher echelons in the system^
The military services have similar distribution systems
and problems, but of even more complicated types. In the first
place, the many different types of ships and planes and the
myriad equipments Installed in them require a large number of
different items in the Inventory; and in the second place, the
world-wide dispersal of these operating elements of our forces
requires a similar supporting dispersion of inventories.
2
The Uavy Supply System is predicated upon management of
inventories by type or category of material in support of
weapon systems, KoQt items in the inventory are centrally
managed at Inventory Control Points, which are established by
category of material, i,e,, missile and ordnance, aviation,
electronics, ships parts, general supplies, automotive and
construction, subsistence, and fuel. Obviously, these
BiWWWH ilW IB III «»»>«—
1 bltin, l9 Qj m eJk*A» P. 17.
2J,y. Forrester, "Industrial Dynamics," iarvard business
ilevlew statistical Decision aeries , p, 73
•
3 p.f, . U..:>,, Department of the i:*avy, Office of Naval
material, tjayy, *9ltel,.,,,M&.^%&&Wto ^or,, Inventory :,ana^emeint,
HAW-, • P-1500. FebruarTTT^O* Chapter II,
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categories have cross-applications In weapons systeaa, but there
la more compatibility for the functions of Inventory management
by type of material than by end-use equipment, The synthesi&ing
of the two concepts Is accomplished by the weapon system
managers, the bureaus of the iiavy Department, who place their
requirements upon and provide information by weapons system to
the inventory managers, who distribute and buy material In
support of these plans, (Without complicating the subjeot, some
of the Inventory Control Points have dual functions: as
inventory managers for their material, and as program managers,
acting for the bureaus, to cross-fertilize the weapon system
program requirements with other IC? 1 *.)
The material is stocked at various supply installations
around the country and overseas. The top echelon of the
stocking system is the distribution points. There are large
supply depots, the two major ones being at Oakland, California
and Norfolk, Virginia. They serve two purposes. They act as
wholesale stock points for the insurance items in the various
inventories, and as immediate support activities for naval units
and installations In their geographical area, This latter
effort includes support of the fleet in the forward areas—
the I editerranean and Western Pacific, The next echelon
consists of primary stock points. These are either smaller
depots at fleet bases, or supply departments of naval shipyards
and naval air stations. They provide direct support to fleet
units in their area. The third echelon Is the retail level,
which consists of stocks maintained on board ships of the fleet
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and at smaller shore Installations for their own use.
The concept of central management requires the
distribution points and primary stock points to report their
usage, or issues, to the Inventory Control Points, This is
performed almost entirely on a transaction or as occurring basis,
utilizing, to a growing degree, rapid data transmission systems.
The TCP's maintain records on £8? equipments for each item in
the inventory; for example, the Naval Ordnance Supply office
controls approximately 140,000 items peculiar to navy ordnance
and missile systems, and the Aviation Supply Office controls
approximately 600,000 Items peculiar to naval aircraft. These
inventory management activities place orders, at the appropriate
time, with many different manufacturers for delivery of material
to the different stock points. A primary concept of Mavy
Inventory management calls for delivery from manufacturer to as
close to end-use as possible. In this respect the Navy does
not use a wholesaler-retailer approach, and the central
processing of usage information eliminates much of the
multiplying effect referred to by Forrester.
The usage or demand that is reported by the reporting
stock points to the ICp's is generated by requisitions plaoed
by the end-user activities of the Mavy: primarily the ships of
the fleet.
Mot all Items in the inventory at the various echelons
are centrally controlled. There are many items of readily
available commercial material or insurance-type repair parts
that either have insufficient Navy-wide demand or are
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uneconomical from a procurement standpoint to manage centrally.
These are referred to as decontrolled item©, and are managed
by each local stock activity, including chips.
Inventories aboard the ships of the Navy are an
important aspect of the distribution system, and more than any
other segment serve the basic purpose of inventories— to buy
time. The development of the ability of the Navy to maintain
itself at sea in a mobile condition has severed the umbilical
cord between the ship and the shore-based support echelons.
It is mandatory that ships be able to sustain themselves while
operating as part of naval task forces or on independent duty.
hen ships are operating, their equipments are
operating; when the equipments are operating, parts are
subjected to wearout and failures. In addition, the normal
housekeeping functions performed by any small city must be
performed, and this require® supplies « The problem In shipboard
inventories is to determine what items to carry and how much.
It may be helpful to trace the progress, briefly, in
ships 1 inventories from the well-known "repair part boxu to the
present integrated system. 1
Until recently, repair parts placed on board ship were
held in the custody of the department having primary Interest
in the particular equipment which the parts supported. This
goes back to the basic military policy that each commander
1 t^n», gg t. .oJUfcf p. 23.
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should have control of his logistic support. The
operations
department held electronic spares; gunnery department,
ordnance
spares; and engineering maintained the stocks of
machinery
spares. Repair parts were stowed primarily in repair
part
boxes with a box of spares provided for each Installed
equipment
or major component.
Sach of these areas of support had the repair part
boxes
stocked in accordance with the requirements of the
technical
bureaus. Each bureau used a different medium for making
its
requirements fcnown to the ship. The media were imown as
"Allowance Lists. « They contained each of the bureaus
1 best
estimate of the parts required to support a given equipment.
The format differed for each technical bureau, but,
generally,
the basic information provided was similar.
hipboard allowance lists are important as an effective
tool for shipboard supply management, of Jcey importance
is
their effect on the endurance capability of the operating
forces*
They serve as guide* for the accomplishment of the initial
outfitting of newly commissioned ships, as technical documents
as well as supply documents for inventory management afloat,
and as oar only available measure of a ship's supply
readiness.
reover, the criteria and policies which govern the
construction of shipboard allowance lists have an extensive
influence on many other actions of the supply system, from the
shipboard level through the echelons to the bureaus and ICP'sJ
_
L iiii._u...J-J. »i mi* 1 ' itiiii iirni-—
"*"—"~",>_^—^.-*^-^
i i.j.i mi Hi ill ii 11 '—"""***
'
M*M"****l>*,**w'*M'w<'www'P'''''WWW*W'>Wi "I" iinn..-
1 iverson eJL&l*» 9V» 9%%x* ?• 26 *
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Under the repair part box concept, however, many
duplications of inventories existed. any identical parts were
used in different equipments, or even the same equipment located
in different parts of the ship. because of the lack of central
Inventory information, the duplicate availability of a part was
not known, in most cases, when a part was lacking in a
particular box for a particular equipment* Basically, there
lacked a centralisation of demand or usage Information and item
availability for parts being used within the ship as a whole.
Personnel of the operating departments having custody
of the spare parts boxes maintained various forms of stock
records, submitting their requirements for stock replenishments
to the Supply >fflcer for procurement action. The Supply
Officer had no inventory management or custody responsibilities.
Inventory control, as exercised by the operating personnel, was
basically "use one from the box—put one back In the box." In
the hands of personnel whose primary Interest and responsibility
was the immediate repair of inoperative equipments, this system
resulted in many inventory control service failures--the parts
did not get replaced. 1
As greater quantities of more complex equipments were
placed aboard ships, the space requirements for the larger or
more numerous repair part boxes exceeded the space available,
especially in destroyers and submarines. Perhaps the most
significant development from the point of view of its












far-reaching effect on current repair parts systems was
discarding the repair part boxes in favor of centralized bin or
drawer storage. The requirements determination, or usage data
base, shifted from the individual unit to a grouping of like
equipments. The foremost proponent of this approach was the
Ulectronlo Supply System., The duplications of items common to
the needs of all electronic systems (plus supply supported
equipments that were program supported by other XCP'a), the
space limitations, and the cost in terms of dollars all
contributed to this development. ^ At the same time the
conversion from box stowage to bin stowage was made, the custody
of the material was transferred to the supply officer. For the
junior officer on a destroyer this was an assumption of
responsibilities of great magnitude.
To eliminate duplication even further, in 1956 the
Coordinated Chipboard Allowance List (C<x$AL) Program was
established. 2 The major objectives were to develop standard
allowance list formats; contrail se shipboard inventories for
all materials; and to consolidate requirements.
The saagnltude of the problems whioh existed and the
scope of the afloat inventory manager's responsibilities has been
multiplied in recent years, for a technological explosion has
been occurring. Mew radio, sonar and radar equipments, not to
mention new and sophisticated weapons systems have b®en
hverson efr aJU, loo, clt.. p. 16.
%•&•« Department of the llavy, Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations, OFKAV Instruction 4441.4 of 20 December 1956.
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Introduced Into the fleet, and more are on the way. Ships
constructed fifteen to eighteen year* ago are being continually
modernized by the removal of older, relatively simple equipments
and replaced with new, vastly more complex gear.
Aa Installed equipments have become more powerful and
complex, there has iteen a commensurate growth in th© number of
repair parts to be carried on board to insure maximum support
of the equipments. A typical destroyer now carries some 17,900
items valued at nearly ^232,000. A guided missile frigate (DLG)
carries about 36,000 items worth 1500,000. A new Fleet Ballistic
issile submarine carries 25,000 items worth 41 $500*000.
Inventories of this magnitude require a logical,
systematic management system, which is understandable and usable




3asio Inventory "-''anaflement Considerations
The management of inventories can be resolved Into three
basic considerations: what to stock; where to stock it; and
the functions of inventory—how much to buy and when to buy it.
The functions of inventory usually occupy the attention of the
inventory manager.
The @nd result of any business is to sell a product.
Therefore, the first consideration of what to stock In business
inventories should be the finished goods and the anticipation of
selling thesu It is obvious that an mntrepr^neur is not going
to invest money in an inventory, unless there 1© some reasonable
anticipation of selling it at a profit within a reasonable
period of time. As part of this consideration, the entrepreneur
will take into account the risk involved In not selling the
product and the loss of the iconey tied up in inventory, Whether
he uses a rational, structured decision-making process, or
whether he trusts to intuition, he will balance these factors
against each other. Similar considerations are made regarding
the raw materials inventory and the work in process inventory
in manufacturing operations. In these cases the anticipation




plant for the material a that go into the finished product. It
is obvious that regardless of the type of product or business,
some decision must be made before an It ens Is carried In
inventory, and that decision will balance cost of carrying the
Item veraus the benefits to be gained from having It available
when wanted.
The problem of selecting items for the military
inventory is analogous in ternjs of anticipated usage. The
majority of the Items in the inventory, as stated, consists of
technical repair parts. These are selected either because it
Is anticipated that parts will fall, requiring replacement with
a certain degree of repetition, or beoause they are what is
referred to as insurance Items, which, in the case of failure,
would adversely affect the operational readiness of the service
because of the length of time required to procure the part*
and the time that the parent equipment would be out of
commission. Consumable supplies are generally selected for
inventories because of their utility for different purposes
and because there ie a repetitive need for the item. 1
both business inventories and military Inventories,
the distribution system, or where to sioctc material, is not an
easily determined faotor. For best service, material should be
stocked near the point of need, but the fact that inventory
effectiveness is generally measured by turnover of Inventory,
and the parochial viewpoints of the different members of
Office of Naval material, loo, pit. , p. 5-1.
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management often combine to maice the decision difficult.
Analysis of the functions of Inventories
The functions of inventory—how much to buy and when to
buy it—are basic to any inventory, whether it be purchased
parts, manufactured parts, work in process, or military parts
or supplies.
Any inventory may be divided into two parts. The first
is the element that has as its prime purpose the filling of
normally anticipated usage. It is Imown as working stock, and
is sometimes referred to as "lot size" stock. It la created by
the quantities that are ordered, and can be seen when the order
arrives as a finite quantity of goods,
Basically, this inventory arrives as an order quantity
is used up and is replaced by another order quantity.
Everything else being equal, the activity of this inventory can
be pictured as a saw-toothed diagram, as shown in Figure 1,
Goods arrive, are depleted, are reordered at a reorder point
which depends upon usage and leadtlme, are replenished by the
new order, and the cycle starts again. ' As can be seen from
this diagram, average working inventory amounts to about half
of the order quantity and is independent of the number of times
per year the cycle is repeated,
The inventory pictured in Figure 1 represents an ideal
1
. ;. ;eloh, Tested Scientific Inventory Control


























Fig. 2.—Functions of Actual Inventory
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Inventory, and in this pure form constats solely of working
stocks. Material is consumed at a constant rate, and at point
R # called the reorder point, the amount of the order quantity,
Q, is placed on order. Material continues to be used during
time period L, which is the leadtime (whether it be purchase
leadtime, manufacturing leadtiiae, assembly leadtime, or some
combination) . The leadtime is the length of time from which the
need for reorder is first noticed j through the preparation of
the order, or paper processing time; through manufacturing
or assembly time; and delivery time to the point where the
material is put in stock, and entered on the stock records. The
reorder point* R, is the quantity of material required to
satisfy consumption during this leadtime period. The terms H
and Q are commonly used terms to denote their respective
concepts of or effects on working stock and are used throughout
this paper.
As a matter of practicality the amount ordered may not
be a quantity greater than H. The reasons for this may be
economic or perhaps because of uncertainties in requirements.
As a result, orders are placed when the following situation
occurs:
Quantity on hand Quantity on order m or is less than
Reorder Point + Obligations or Backorders.
Conceptually, the saw-toothed diagram in Figure 1 would operate
in the same manner, except that I would be above the amount of
stock on hand at any one time. If Dues are added, the amount
on hand plus on order would just reach R when each Q Is ordered.
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If usage and leadtime would just behave the same way all
the time, the problems of Inventory management would be greatly
reduced. Reorders would be placed at a reorder point equal to
the leadtlme multiplied by the usage, the new order would
arrive just as the last unit of the old stock was Issued, and
the problems would be pretty much confined to the determination
of the order quantities.
Unfortunately, the facts of life are different!
Leadtlmo, or usage, or both will vary. Actual results would
loolc something llfce Figure 2; the new order would arrive ahead
of need some of the time and after the need In others, due to
fluctuations in demand during leadtime, and in some oases due
to variations in leadtime. As a matter of fact, it would be
expected that on& would happen as often as the other, and the
Inventory would fail, or stoe&outs would occur in one out of
two orders (this results from using average demands? in an
average half of the occurrences are greater than the average,
and half are less). The probability of 50^ stoekouts when
there is no safety factor in the reorder point is an Important
concept* Being out of stock for even a short time every other
order is not usually considered satisfactory inventory
performance. It is therefore necessary to reorder at sosae
point in time prior to the point one would like to, so that the
order will arrive before the last unit of the old stoc*<: is
issued out. The effect of this action is to increase stools
levels,
This introduces the seoond element of any inventory—
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safety or fluctuation stocks. The amount of safety stock is the
number of units by which the reorder point is advanced ahead of
what is normally expected to be needed, in an attempt to reduce
the probability of stoakout. This is illustrated in Figure 2.
At point H2 quantity Q is ordered, which arrives at time T2>
after there has been a need for material, but no stocks to
issue. In the second case, safety stocks have been created, so
that when Q is ordered at H4 and the material is delayed in
receipt or the usage has increased, a stockout condition le not
encountered, but rather part of the safety stocks are issued.
The total average inventory on hand, then, is the sum
of the average working inventory ( referred to as £Q) , and all
of the safety stock . It becomes very apparent that safety stook
is an important part of the total inventory, and that it is not
easily identified. Working inventory Is quite easily
identifiable; one need only check on order quantity practloes
to know the inventory that is created by orders. On the other
hand, to identify safety stock, one must go to some record which
will show what was on hand at the time each order was received. 1
This is more difficult.
The important thing is that safety stock is created to
reduce the probability of stockout during leadtlme to less than
; how much less is one of the main problems of Inventory
management
,
The principal causes of inventories, then, are expected
1 Welch, loo, olt. . p. 25.
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changes (anticipation) in coat or demand functions;
discontinuities in rates of ordering, production, and sales;
and the uncertainty of demand. 1 The problem of discontinuities
in demand has special effects on military inventories.
Deff+lBfl problems $.n j>43U*aT7 £nvffltor|es
Demand is the most Important and difficult element to
consider In making good inventory asnageinent decisions. The
military supply business la plagued with the problem that in
almost all classes of material most of the items have low demand
rates and highly unpredictable demand patterns. This particular
problem is recognized by Hitch: 2
Out of 100*000 spares allocated as repair parts for a
modern bomber, only 50% say be used at all, and then only
101 used only at depots (large repair facility). Demand
for parts at one base may not necessarily be predictable
for spares used at others, About \Q to 30;? of spares used
on raodern aircraft are peculiar to that model and
configuration, and at a two-wing bomber base, about half
of the spare parts for which demands are realized might
be at a rate of lower than ten a year. In most cases,
demands are lower. Actual variations from month to month
are greater when average demand Is low. l>uch a variation
leaves the mean with little significance. The old military
concept of so many weeks of supply as a measurement of
stocks, while suitable for, say the cavalry with horses to
feed, may be most dangerous when applied to modern aircraft.
Figure 3 Is an illustration of observed failure rates
for spares for the Atlas IC3M guidance system. 2 This group
2Hitch and KoKean, loo, bit. , p. 272
***** 'iarr > Roaort ^i Phase A, Horn Cone material
Management utudv . Technical Kilitary Planning operation Report
rt58-TM?-21 C:anta Barbara, Calif.: General Electric Co., 20
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consisted of about 5,500 items for which demand was studied ovor
a tan-month period. It la seen that about 5,000 Item©
experienced no demand; about 200 had one demand, which la a
mean demand of . 1 p*r month; and about ten items had demands
for ten, which Is a mean of 1 p&r month. The natural reaction
to this might be that it is to be expected, since a high degree
of reliability should have been designed into an ICBM nose cone #
However, the same source refers to a similar pattern in spares
applicable to the 0-47 aircraft, and the Navy has a similar
situation in submarine spares. Recognizing that these are all
spare parts, refer to Figure 4. The profile of submarine repair
parts is practically identical to this, yet the profile
presented In this illustration was taken from a study of general
supplies at the Naval Supply Center, ^an Diego, California, in
connection with management of decontrolled material. 2 Here it
Is seen that out of 5,463 items over a three-year period, 736
or 21 •' experienced demands of one or less, 848 or H£ had
demands of less than ten per quarter. This is in a category of
material which is supposed to be character ized by repetitive
demands, or so-called fast-moving items.
It is this preponderance of Items with rery low demand
rates that causes moat of the difficulty in supply management
— -—— — ' '—^ .^^-^ —«-— .i ^..,-,- —— ... -.-.—., ,-..--,.—...,, ,
, r —— "iT- jr— i
-u i
-
i r t ibiu iih -11 111 11 1 i .
ttf.S., Department of the Navy, Bureau of Supplies and
Accounts, Introduction to Variable ^tocic . evels (.lune, 1960),
p. 4— i .
%.F. Mcintosh, Improvement of Local Supply Leolslon
Rules at 11^. -an ^leao . Report PHC-132 (Santa Monica. Calif.:
Planning uesearch Corp., t October 1939), p. 3»
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in the armed forces* In addition to comprising most of the
inventory, slow-moving Items also present a high variability in
demand. Relative variability of demands la determined by
measuring demand occurrences as a percentage of average demand.
While variability at high demand rates is greater in absolute
terms, variability at low demand rates is greater in relative
terms. For an item with a mean demand of one per quarter, a
demand of six at one time (not an unusual occurrence) would be
600$ of the average, while for an item with a mean demand of
.1 per quarter, a demand of three at on© time (once again, not
an unusual thing) would be 3,000% of the average,* Methods of
coping with this problem are discussed under the concept of
probability theory.
KgffW VflM* Analyses
There is one general characteristic of most inventories
which is of paramount importance, but is one that is often
overlooked. It suggests a plan for managers in their approach
to inventories. This characteristic is that some items of any
inventory have a much higher annual dollar usage than others,
which causes a concentration of dollar usage in a relatively
small percentage of the total items. Richmond suggests that
10 % of the items may contain 15% of the money value of annual
usage; 23,£ of the items 95% of the money value. 2 The
I
Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, loo, clt. . p. 4-4.
2H.J. Richmond, "Streamlined Inventory Control and




corollary, of course, is that 75- of the items represent only %%
of the dollar usage. Figure 5 portrays the effect of this
characteristic
.
This phenomenon of Inventories is applicable to all
types of Inventories: spare parts, general supplies, or
commercial inventories; although the ratios may differ from
those suggested above, they are generally in the same " ball-
park, * The first step In any inventory study should be to take
a large enough sample to determine the character of the
inventory with respect to this usage-value of distribution. It
is important, because it is the key to the amount of effort and
raoney that should be spent in the control of different items in
the inventory. Obviously, much more attention should be given
to high value items than low value, and in effect the low value
items, because of the relatively little importance in dollar
usage, can be given pretty such a "broad brush" approach in
applying management techniques. Ae stated previously, the xaain
constraint on management of inventories, as well as any other
decision, is the dollar constraint of limited, funds available
for various programs.
The general approach to inventory management that is
suggested by this is obviously selected value management. This
has been referred to by the General Electric Company as the
-C system. l ;*ure 5» the small wjmbQ? of items
contributing to 75-1 of the dollar usage are labeled A) the












Percentage of Number of Items in the Inventory
Fig. 5.—Relations lip of Number of Items in
Inventory to Total Annual Dollar Usage

'hipboarfl J nventores-~Tfae Problem Isolated
The problem of what to stoek aboard ship is on© coming
under the oogniaance of the Chief , Bureau of Snipe and Chief,
Bureau of ftaval weapons, who are responsible for the support of
the equipments installed aooard ship, 1
The stoe&age of parts on a ship of the United states
Navy is accomplished through the OOflat, there is a separate
CQ2AL for each ship for each type of material, Each of the
ClOSALa consists of three parts: Fart ne is an index of all
equipments supported by that COSAL, including those that are
supply supported, in response to the requirements levied by the
Chief of the Bureau on the program support ICPj Part Two
consists of Allowance Parts ,,ists, one for each equipment.
This serves two purposes—-one is an identification aid to the
technician, since it identifies parts to equipment drawing
designations, and the other Is an allowance of parts required to
support that equipment or that component of a larger equipment.
Part Three Is a listing in stock number order of all repair
parts allowed on board to support the equipments listed in Part
One.
Obviously the heart of the accuracy of the allowance
rests in the Allowance Parts List. Repair parts are placed on
ships primarily to serve the needs of the ship on which they
are loaded. 2
'U.S., Department of the Havy, Bureau of Supplies and
Accounts, jiiouai.ISA Manual. Para. 31001.
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The question la: 4hioh parte will fail? tfhich will
fail most often? And which parts are most important to the
security of the nation, aa represented by that ship? The
answers are generally obtainable (but not always sought) if the
system la a few years old. Data on parts usage can be projected
mathematically into answers which tell now much to stock, but on
new equipments "technical Judgment*' la relied upon* This ia
where engineering and planning specialists venture into the
realm of intuition—a realm peopled by the bureaus, fleet
representatives, ICP technicians, and manufacturers
specialists. 1
An Allowance Farta Liat ia made up at the time an
equipment or component of an equipment la firat purchased for
installation in the fleet. It ia an engineer's estimate,
supplemented by varying quantities of actual usage data and
experience, of what repair parts should be carried by the ship
to satisfy the moat likely repair part needs of the equipment.
The AFL cannot provide an allowance for ev@r^ possible repair
part item which might be required by the ship. It is not
intended to do ao, for neither storage space on the ship nor
funds available would permit carrying in stoolt every item which
might conceivably fail. However, it has been shown that an APL
may not only omit items required to satisfy unusual, random
demands, but it also may not allow items on which repetitive
*J.*5. Tamalavage, HKow Bang for the Buck," Monthly
Newsletter—Imagine of the Kavy Supply Corps . Vol. X^V, No. 6
(June, 1962), p. 16.
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demands are experienced.* This may occur because of the
engineering eatlmata aspect of requirement determinations, or
because Imperfections In manufacture, Installation or
maintenance say result In unusual or repetitive demands aboard
a given ship.
As an example, In the Pacific Fleet all guided missile
frigates were placed la Destroyer Squadron 15 for the first year
of commissioning. These ships operated under basically the same
conditions, had the same equipments installed, and in fact, two
were built by the same builder. Each of the ships had different
problem areas: one in missile fire control; another in the
engineering plant; and yet another in the shlp^ radar
installation. Yet all had the same allowances of repair parts
for these equipments. As a result of situations such as this,
each ship is required, in effect, to develop its own allowances
baaed on failures or usage that may occur. For the Polaris
program, a computer method of assembling demand for each ship
and revising allowances for each ship has been developed. 2
The decision of where to stock the material, with
reference to shipboard inventories, is tied into the decision
regarding what to stock. Usage data refinement is helpful, but
there Is another element that enters Into the "technical
Judgment" or intuitive determinations made, and that is
1 kenz, loo, oit. . p. 26.
%ersonal in
B.C., October, 1962.
'erson terview with Cdr, w.&, Woodard, Washington,

regarding insurance Items. This category cone late of items that
do not have any anticipated repetitive demand, but are
sufficiently essential to the operation of the equipment as to
warrant their stocking as insurance against the possibility of
failure, stooking of insurance Items falls into two categories:
stocking aboard ship or stocking in the supply system • In both
cases a rationalization is made of procurement lead time against
necessity for the item.
Usage data for shipboard inventory management Is an
Integral part of the functions of inventory—the how-much-and-
when-to-order considerations. For the Supply Officer afloat
this Is his main problem. Recognizing the tremendous growth in
the workload and Importance of the function of repair parts
management in destroyers, and in anticipation of almost certain
future growth. In Oepteinber, i960 a study was made of this area
In the ships under the control of Coamander, Destroyers, United
tates Atlantic fleet. It coon became apparent that inventory
management afloat was not optimum in quality or efficiency, and
that the destroyer inventory manager was not always saving
fullest use of the materials made available to him by the
Inventory manager ashore. This study revealed the need for
detailed procedures governing the conduct of operations in this
vital area. Hard-pressed destroyer Supply officers had neither
the time nor the experience to develop their own procedures.
The frequent change of supply officers and key enlisted
personnel produced an endless variety of systems and procedures
lacking In consistency and continuity and often failing to

38
achieve the desired objectives. Analysis of afloat Inventory
management revealed that all destroyer-type ships faced
substantially the same problems. * These problems are not
limited to destroyer-type ships, but because of the greater
number of destroyers and the relative inexperience of their
personnel cause more problems.
The guide lines that are published for the supply
officer afloat use the same general terms that have been
discussed previously In the commercial or general environment,
Unfortunately, the guidance is general, and does little, other
than place the responsibility for "effective" inventory
management on the supply officer of each ship. 2 The function,
Q, is referred to as the operating level of supply—that which
is required to sustain operations between requisition or arrival
of successive shipment. The safety level is described in the
same general terms, and the reorder level also corresponds to
the situation as described, I.e., leadtlme plus safety level.
The Bupply Officer la made responsible for maintaining
stock within the limits of the operating plans of the ship, 3 and
further states that he will establish high and low limits (order
point and order quantity) for all items except those with an
allowance list quantity of less than two. The principle purpose
of these shipboard inventories, in the terms we have used, is to
buy time. The time that is bought Is the ability of the ship to
1 Lenz, loo, clt. , p. 24.
2BUSMDA Kanual . para. 36000. ^Ibld. . para. 33016-2,
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operate for specif led periods of time. This is referred to as
endurance levels. The Chief of Naval operations and the Fleet
Commanders prescribe stoefcage objectives in terms of endurance.
In principle, ships should always have sufficient supplies on
board to operate without replenishment for a period equal to the
stockage objective as stipulated. * At each replenishment
opportunity, ships are required to load to capacity. Operating
schedules for ships are planned so that the replenishment
opportunity will normally foe afforded prior to the time
supplies on board reach the safety level. In other words, a
procurement lead time is set for ships. Unfortunately, this is
an area of various interpretations. The fleets operate within
them, but allowance lists are constructed on different endurance
concepts. Ordnance parts are allowed for a 71-month period;
electronic parts for one year in the case of insurance items
and three months for repetitive use Items; and ships machinery
parts for 4,000 operating hours or one year. 2
Lack of standardization of procedures on a rational,
logical basis is further complicated by the Supply Operations
Assistance Program. This program involves off-loading,
identification, inventory, remarking, removal of excesses,
requisition of deficiencies, and re-stowage of all repair part
^J&X&x, Para. 31041.
^Personal interview with r. J. Chimenick, Allowance and
Load List Section, ; aterlal Management Branch, Bureau of




items at the time a ship goes through its shipyard overhaul. 1
In the Atlantis Fleet determination of excesses and deficiencies
is based on a twenty-four-month usage quantity, 2 evidently
because this is the period of time between overhauls. In the
Pacific Fleet, shortages are based on one-year usage and
excesses on two-years usage .3
It can be seen that the rules governing the timing and
quantities involved in replenishment actions are confusing and
difficult to audit, rfhlle it is generally desirable that there
be no withdrawal of material from storeroom stocks without
timely replacement, it is not desirable that the "use one-
order one" procedures be followed without exception* The result
of the latter policy would be, in the case of some fast-moving
items, constant requisitioning actions for v&ry small
quantities. Consequently, both the ship and the shore echelons
would be burdened with an unnecessarily large volume of
requisitions to be processed. Procurement actions can be
deferred and requisitioning actions saved, only by postponing
replenishments on those items experiencing a high frequency of
demand.^
Before leaving the area of the functions of inventory,
two Inconsistencies should be Indicated, Although a stage is
mmmmmmmmmmmmm-^mmmtmmmmmmmmmmmmmmiiilii nwt i mr. mn*mmmtmm i m i n i ii« » »n ihk i hiiiii nmii——«— mi n . n m « immihh i i i
1 Lenz, lpo
ft PU«» P* 26,
2U,3.
f
Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, ClilCLAIOTLT
Instruction ?444l,6 . p, 1-30,
3tJ,8M Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, CISCPACFLT
Instruction 4441.4. p. >3.
4Lenz, loo
tt .ftUftt P* *7«
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set for determination of working stocks, the definition of
endurance levels aa prescribed by the fleet commanders and the
period between replenishment opportunities 1b not the sane. In
addition, different items have different usage rates, thereby
requiring different replenishment frequencies. Therefore, the
question of how much to order and when to order it is still open
to interpretation. Some items, in other words, do not require
replenishment each replenishment opportunity. If a two-year
usage quantity is on hoard it would not be ordered every three
months
•
The matter of demand variations has been reiterated by
the study of the destroyer inventory management. In this case
it was found that &urln& a three-year period, Z5% of the items
on the allowance list do not experience demands. In addition,
it was learned that only about 2$ of the items allowed on board
experience repetitive demands. The demands for these few items
represented about 50 ' of the issues from stock. ' Although
dollar values were not applied to this particular analysis, it
is apparent that the A3C structure would be portrayed.
Based on this, the Atlantic Fleet Destroyer Force
instituted a Selective Item Management program, wherein the
fast-moving Items were segregated for Individual management.
Fast-moving items were defined as those with three or more
demands in the period between shipyard overhauls, i.e., since
the last soap processing, 2

CHAPTER IV
A COHCEPT—SCIENTIFIC INVENTORY CONTROL
tatlstioal Decision Theory
Just before and during World War II a new concept began
to emerge—the concept of statistical Decision Theory. ;ot only
was this new concept comprehensive enough to include all that is
currently covered in the subject of statistics, but in addition,
it involved ideas from other areas, such as the theory of gases,
cost accounting, information theory, logic, and econo&ics.
Consequently, the name "statistical decision" is
something of a misnomer. I -any people other than statisticians
have contributed important ideas. The statisticians arrived on
the scene rather late, and more or less accidentally. They
translated the existing ideas into statistical terms, added
some Ideas of their own, and then assembled all of these
concepts into an integrated mechanise for making decisions.
This decision machine has already been applied to such divers®
areas as military strategy and betting on horses.
The main reason why ssany of the repercussions of
statistical decision have not \>&®n felt is that publications on
the subject are written for fellow specialists ; even they
sometimes have difficulty understanding them. It may take




oomprehona ible form and even longer before they are taught to
students. 2pecific techniques in cookbook form say be
transmitted more rapidly, but the ideas diffuse slowly , t
In the specific area of inventory control this is
probably more true than in those areas of management peopled by
persons with engineering or mathematical baoicgrounda. It is
the personal observation of the writer that as soon as a group
of complex mathematical expressions is introduced to a group of
non-mathematielan Inventory managers, there is an immediate
resistance to the entire concept, promoted by the feeling that
what cannot be readily understood cannot be worth knowing. This
reaction probably holds true for application of the entire field
of operations research.
The expression of concepts in mathematical terms does
not require the express lone necessarily to be specified
quantitatively. It is the interrelation of factors that Is
Important* As Ansher stated: 2
The Intellectual issue to be grasped firmly is the
necessity for distinguishing between quantitative
specificity, on the one side, and accuracy in the sense
of Identity with true value on the other* The language
of mathematics differs from the language of words not
because it Is more accurate, but because it is more
manipulatable* It invites comparisons not invited by
verbal statement; and leads to more thoroughly documented
conclusions.
A concept not appreciated by operating personnel is
1 1rwin D.J, Isross, Design
,
for decision (New tork: The
Mian Co., 1953), p. h
elvln Ansher, "Price Tags for business Policies,"
:-rvard business Review . Vol. 38, Ho. 1, p. 77.

that even when certain of the factors are specified, the
quantification does not have to be precise, ;Jot understanding
this, the entire qualitative concept is rejected. Qualitative
judgments made by management can be quantified under pressure,
and need not be accurate to be valuable. One analysis of
production scheduling demonstrated that cost errors of a factor
of two produced costs only 11$ higher than would have been
incurred with correct estimates of costs, 1 This allows
considerable leeway in estimation of factors (or parameters) #
and yet provides for substantiated decisions.
As important as anything else in the field of statistical
decision theory is the application of economics. It is the
recognition of the fact that there are underlying values to all
decisions. This is certainly apparent in the Department of
Defense today. In developing alternative solutions to problems,
the impact of the defense budget on the national income and
gross national product requires the maximum utilization and
optimum management of our resources—men, material, and money,
It is a process of economic trade-offsj decisions are now being
made on what to buy and how much to buy on the basis of a
massive exercise in operations research. Operations research
has been used often before, but only in the lower echelons of
the individual services, and not as the prime basis for overall
DOT) determination of force levels, 2
!m*t> p. w«
-M Defense Budg
^eej£, February 3, 1962, p, ?6,
^" et (Jets Unified for the First Time,"

45
It is axiomatic that w© recognise that resources are
always limited In comparison with our wants* always constraining
our &otIon* If they did not, m could do ©verythins and there
would be no probis® of choosing preferred courses of action* •
should* therefore* Inquire Into the constraints that exist* 1
too often the Impression Is given that the economic
approach In Washington Is an attempt to put a definite price
tag on all factors bearing on decisions* In order to arrive at
optimum solutions* This is partially true; it Is an attempt to
Quantify* but quantitative economic analysis cannot determine
opt lams solutions in generally acceptable ways all the time*
*ever* It forces the aanaser to ma&e a choice* 2 It is
recognised that there are uncertainties in any decision, as well
as incommensurable® or those consequences of alternatives that
cannot o© readily translated Into the comoon denominator being
used* 1*©** dollars*^ The important thing is that fcoth
uncertainties and incommensurables should not oe ignored, for
they have a bearing on the problem and should be considered
intuitively* if nothing elae*^
The whole point in this discussion of decision theory
is to stress the fact that decisions can be structured* and that
quantification* while it n^Bd not he precise, helps define the
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conceptual capability—th© ability to s©e th© "big picture,"
1th this, decisions that are made will be more rational and
will be bettor substantiated.
ft?a,fqtlf E,o Jnyen^ory Conftro?.
Scientific inventory control I» a concept, embodying
mathematical technique© as tools to manage inventories In an
economical manner* It Is a part of statistical decision theory
and is a synthesis of economic decision theory and probability
theory.
The field of inventory management ha© proved to be a
desirable field for drawing together the interests of people of
widely divergent backgrounds, because of its fundamental
importance in business , management is willing to cooperate in
providing descriptive data and in experimenting with the
application of new theoretical models. At the ©am© time, the
problems involved have been of such a nature as to engross the
attention of leading scientists in the fields of economics and
statistics. Th© issues involved have been susceptible to
approaches that run th© gamut from extremely simple to highly
developed abstract models,
*
*t studies in the area of inventory control have
concentrated on the lot size and safety allowance aspects, as
Indeed, these are the most significant areas. Recently , though,
linear and dynamic programming and servo-mechanism technique©
have been introduced. Linear programming is applied mainly to
* hit In, oo. cit. . p. 231.

47
situations with important seasonal fluctuations in demand from
period to period in an effort to reduce the fluctuations in
production and optimise the reduced overtime coBts with the
increased inventory carrying costs. This has applications to
and is being used on the redistribution of material within the
multi-structural inventory distribution system of the Navy. 1
srvo-taeohanism approaches have application to the
sporadic and fluctuating demand problem. It is based upon
estimating usage patterns and using the feedback, of actual
usage to modify the prediction. It is generally comparable to
the quality control techniques of using standard deviations
around the mean, and gives the ability to adjust operations to
actual conditions. 2
The first lot size formula was presented in 1959»-* but
the introduction of these techniques is progressing at a
relatively slow rate. As Kelnitzky says.
The aborigine *new nothing about inventory control, and
quite possibly his 20th century corporate counterpart is
equally unenlightened. The changeover from inventory to
inventory control bears no date, Soae concerns plunged
into the healthful waters of scientific management of
inventories well before the first ^orld War; others are
still on the shore contemplating the advisability of
wetting their toes,
everal factors account for the transition to scientific
inventory control from a liquidity preference approach, i irst,
1 A.«;. Clark and H. Scarf, Optl&al policies for & ..ultl-
Echelon Inventory E'roplea . Report PRC-113 (oanta Monica, Calif.:
Planning Research Corp., July 10, 1959).
nltin, loc. olt. . p. 236, ?Jbld. . p, 213.
48. : elnitsky, anaaement of Industrial Inventory
(New York: r. oGraw-Hlll Boo* Co., 1951 ), p. 3,

the increasing aiae of business establishments issues operations
more difficult; second, sanagefflent personnel nave had more
business training and are more awara of the ramifications of
Inventory management} and third, tnere la an increasing
emphasis on having engineer® in business to give a scientific
approach to management in general •
'
The managemsnt of inventories has been frequently
treated as an intuitive process in which management must rely
on experienced requisit loners with a "feel" for the problem In
order to interpret properly broad directives. Lacking a more
suitable tool, these directives take the form of: "Use your
best judgment in the determination of order quantities, but
watch your total inventory,'* and ''Arrange the timing of your
purchases and your manufacture to avoid interruptions in the
line, but don't take excessive risss of obsolescence or
unneeded inventory" Amendments to these directives are lifcely
to be Just as broad and vague
•
management needs a tool that will describe its policies
in such a way that they can be precisely and uniformly
interpreted by requisitioned. The advent of high speed
computers iaak©s it impossible to rely on individual decisions.
Despite the ability of the computer to mafce a staggering number
of exactly correct computations in seconds, the simplest
intuitive decision is completely beyond its capabilities.
?4anagement decisions have to be made in the only terms the
^
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machine understands i exact Instructions expressed in
mathematical terms.
Scientific Inventory control Is this tool for better
management control of Inventory decisions* It requires the
evaluation of the many Individual factors which enter Into
decisions, and this is good, whether the business or
distribution system be large or small, or whether the results
of the decisions come from people or electronic computers. It
encourages the combination of problems that are alike for
blanket decisions and the separation of problems that are
different for Individual decisions. It encourages the
application of the most effort and analysis to the items which
are Important, and of the least to those items which are not so
important .
*
Today's business magazines are devoting much space, and
management seminars are devoting much time, to this Mnew
approach" to inventory control. The facts are that a few far-
sighted experts have been writing about inventory formulas for
a long time, and several companies have la^en applying them for
as long as twenty-five or thirty years. Yet for some reason,
acceptance of the application of formulas is just beginning to
come into its own in modern business. The advent of the data
processing machine may be having an effect, but that is not the
whole answer, Whatever the reason, the recognition of the
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gaining by leaps and bounds.
*
To understand the principles of the analytic approach,
one must have some Idea of the basic functions of Inventories,
Fundamentally, inventories serve to uncouple successive
operations in the prooeos of making a product and getting it to
the consumer. Inventories make it unnecessary to sear
production directly to consumption or, alternatively, to force
consumption to adapt to the necessities of production. The
essential question is; At what point does the uncoupling
function of inventory stop earning enough advantage to justify
the investment required? 2
forking without a complete analysis of the determining
factors, there is a tendenoy to make or buy too much of the
high cost items (creating unneeded Inventory) and too little of
the low cost items (creating too many orders and costly
stockouts). The short procurement time items are bought or
made too soon (again creating unneeded inventory) and the long
procurement Items too late (again creating stockouts). Better
decisions result in lower inventory, few orders, and improved
service.
3
quan^f 3tQat4pn 9t Paraffetera--^qrtan,fi S^oofrs
we have been talking of the values of the analytical
approach and quantification of inputs; what does this mean in
teras of how much and when factors of inventory? broadly
hbld. . P« *3. %agee, loo, cit. . p. 160.
jlch, loc T clt. . p. 14.
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speaking, we are talking about one thing: optimization of costs
In the economist's approach, we recognize that funds are not
unlimited to do all the things that we wish; therefore, we
recognize the constraints put upon us by the limitation of our
resources. To generalize even further, we are concerned with
three coat factors influencing Inventory decisions: the costs
of obtaining inventories, the costs of carrying inventories, and
the costs of not having inventories when needed, or what is
called shortage or penalty costs, We seek to characterize the
optimal policy for the dynamlo inventory model in terms of the
various cost factors combined with the uncertainty of demand,
1
It Is essential to recognize, however, that in the application
of the economist's approach, it ia impossible to choose that
policy which simultaneously maximizes gain and minimizes costs,
because there Is no such policy—maximum gain Is infinitely
large, and minimum cost is zero. 2
Recognizing that the scientific decision approach is to
actcowledge the different parameters, we find that there is a
high degree of unanimity of what costs should be considered.
Magee provides a comprehensive definition of the coats that
directly influence Inventory policy:-*
Costs depending on the amount ordered include quantity
discounts offered by vendors; set up costs in internal
1 Arrow, ^arlin, and Soarf, log, cj^t. . p, 135.
%itch and MoKean, loo, olt. . p. 165.
3 agee, loo* olt. . p. 163.
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manufacturing operations and clerical coats of making out a
purchase order; and, when capacity Is pressed, the profit on
production lost during downtime for setup* Shipping costs
represent another factor to the extent that they influence the
quantity of raw materials purchased and resulting raw materials
stock levels, the size of lntra-plant or plant*warehouse
shipments, or the size and frequency of shipments to the
customer.
Production costs, beyond setup or changeover costs,
mentioned above, include the abnormal or non-routine costs of
production whose size may be affected by the policies or control
methods used. Overtime, shakedown, hiring, and training
represent costs that have a direct bearing on inventory policy.
Costs of handling and storing Inventory include expenses
of handling products in and out of stools, storage coats, such
as rent and heat, insurance and taxes, obsolescence and
spoilage costs, and capital costs. Inventory obsolescence and
spoilage costs may take several forms, including outright
spoilage after a more or less fixed period? risk that a
particular unit in stock or a particular product number will
become technologically unsalable except at a discount or as
spare parts, or go out of style, etc.
In a production environment another author* states that
In repetitive manufacture, where the annual output Is g>ad« up
of long runs of identical pieces, a sufficient number of pieces
» n »—»—»—»»——«—-—»»— m i . '. I i n i : i m il " ' win i i—«»—« i nn « i»»«m»^w-
*L.P. Alford and J.R. Sanfts, Production Handbook
(Mew York: Ronald Press Co., 1943), p. 99.

must be run In each batch to offset the cost of planning,
ordering, tooling, moving, and masting ready the work and the
machine, but not so many aa to Incur avoidable carrying charges
on idle finished parts. There Is obviously a point at which
these two influences will balance each other.
Unfortunately, however, nowhere in the accounting
department Is there found the cost of an order for even the
simplest Inventory; nor Is there a figure for the cost of
carrying an Inventory, tfhile there Is agreement on the
formulas, there Is a variation In views on the determinations
of the constants. This variation, though, does not appear to
vary largely In the final result, even though different
subsidiary inputs are used. In the holding cost estimate, for
example, Alford and Bangs * state that inventory carrying charges
for average warehouse stocks should be set at about 25# p^v
annum. This Is divided as follows:










An Important element in the determination of which rate
to assign is whether the itest is an active Item or a desiraole
item. Depreciation, including deterioration, obsolescence,




including extra handling, accounting, in addition to those
mentioned above, are higher for desirable Items than for active
items
.
It is obvious that the cost of carrying inventory will
vary greatly for different classes of material. Each company
should ma^e its own estimate based on its experience of handling
and storage charges, and losses from depreciation, obsolescence,
etc. To indicate that "ball park" figures are quite often
satisfactory, whit In states* that three companies replying to
a questionnaire used holding rates of 20^, 13^, and 17^.
In the Navy, a number of studies has been made to
determine the cost of holding stock: at various supply
activities. These studies have shown that, system-wide, the
warehousing and other physical costs amount to less than H of
the average inventory valuation, Even for items requiring
special handling or a controlled environment, such as
refrigerated storage space, these costs are only about 2% of
the inventory value. However, there are two other elements of
the holding costs which are roughly ten to 100 times as
important as the physical holding costs, these are the
obsolescence oost and the Interest rate or time preference
rate * 2
Obsolescence cost is the portion of holding cost which
reflects the fact that demand for the iteic may disappear or
Hhltin, Iqq. olt, , p, 220,
p
'ureau of Supplies and Accounts, 1 ntrod uat lon to




fall off drastically. If this occurs, the iteai is generally
disposed of at a fraction of its original value* > This loss of
of value at disposal time Is a part of holding coat, since it
would not have been Incurred if the Item ware not held In stock.
Since the obsolescence cost Is obviously dependent upon the cost
of the Item which say become obsolete, It Is usually expressed
as a percentage or fraction of the unit cost. In the same
manner as other portions of the holding cost. Obsolescence
costs can be very high (over 100# per year for new technical
repair parts on sophisticated weapons systems subject to
engineerlug modifications), but probably range from 3# to \Q%
for general stores material.
The Interest or time preference rate reflects the fact
that money Is scarce, or more specifically, that there are
other immediate uses for money than Investment In Inventories,
Even If there were no such thing as physical holding cost or
obsolescence cost and no demand uncertainty, one would still
not buy the total future expected demand for an Inventory,
because money Is too valuable In other uses, A quantitative
measure of this "value of money** Is the Interest rate, or as It
Is called In the Kavy, tiae preference rate. If money is
scarce or * tight*1 the effective Interest rate Is high; If
money is plentiful, the interest rate is low, With the Yevy
tight budgets the military services face, the effective
Interest rat© for Inventory investment is In the neighborhood
of 19$, Therefore, for each dollar invested in inventory, it
IS assumed that there is a charge of 15^ per year which must be
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added to the holding coat. It Is obvious that this time
preference rate cannot be precisely determined, but it has been
fairly well estimated. For example, in applying scientific
inventory control procedures to provisioning spare parts for
components of the Polaris missile program, Admiral Haborn was
asked how much money he would give up out of this year's
budget If assured of a certain amount next year. His reply was
equated to a preference rate of about 20^. Other estimates
have been derived in a similar way, for example, considering
the implicit balance between funds available for buying stock,
and funds available for operations, or th© procurement function*
From this has been derived the 15# figure referred to.
Three elements of the holding cost have been discussed;
storage coats, obsolescence costs, and interest costs. Since
the last two are much larger than the first, and since they are
roughly proportional to the unit cost, it is common to express
the complete holding cost as a function of the unit cost. The
Navy used a 20 t annual holding cost in its initial
implementation of these policies, which was centered around
general stores material, 1
This has been a rather rigorous exposition of the cost
parameters of the working stock portion of inventories » It
was done for the purpose of pointing up the aany factors that
must enter into the decisions to be made. In fact, rcoat
1 A,J, dradwoial, technical Description of th© S^andA
stqak.. Table Program , Report PRO262 (^anta Monica, Calif,:
Planning Research Corp., 1 August 196?), p. 25,
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decisions In our business and personal lives involve weighing
the divergent results of alternate decisions, and it is the
primary point of this paper that these decisions represent
alternative values or costs. This is implicit in all decisions
that are made. And so it is with inventories* The decisions of
how much and when of inventory usually will be the measurement
or comparison of the relative costs of one decision as compared
to another. In doing this, managers may make completely
arbitrary decisions as to the willingness to tie up funds in
inventories of certain types. Under such special and limiting
conditions, many have felt that statistical approaches are not
applicable, when, in fact, mathematics may be the best possible
means for expressing; these limitations, and the application of
formulas may be the key to their management.
The Formula Approach to Worsting Stocks
hy formulas at all? Requlsitloners in inventory
control and purchasing have been malcing decisions from a
background of experience for many years, and companies have
prospered. But that la not good enough in tomorrow's business
world. Taiie, for example, the many parameters to inventory
doc is ions that have been examined above. Management has its
choice between relying upon an individual's appraisal of these
factors, or of making a management decision as to how they
should be evaluated. Under the pressure of competition and
speeded»up business, it is going to be necessary to hire more
indlvlduala to make more intuitive decisions or to adopt

-.•nine methods In order to speed up the whole deela ion-staging
process .
*
The application if a formula to the determination of
sliiQ of working stocks la based on the very simple concept of
Biiniaia&ing total annual costs of carrying an Inventory and the
buying of that inventory. I i;?,ure 6 deplete the relationship of
the two factors. Aa the size of inventories increases, the
total annual coats of carrying those Inventories increases in
direct proportion. On the other hand, as the amount of
inventory inoreases, the frequency with which procurements are
made decreases, and therefore the total annual procurement
costs decrease « Mathematically this can be expressed ass
rtotal annual costs s average working
stocks x holding cost + number of annual
procurements x reorder cost.
The point was previously made that average working stocks are
one-half the reorder quantity, which was denoted as Q.
Therefore, Jd is substituted in the formula. Holding costs
are expressed as a percentage, 1} unit cost as u; and reorder
cost as a. The number of annual procurements is equal to the
total annual demand dividend by the reorder quantity, so the
number of procurements annually is expressed as Y/CU The
formula then becomes; TAG » Ci/2 x ui + Y/Q * <*• ^his solves
into the classic "lot size" formula? 2
^.f* . ..eloh, loo. olt>. p. I5ff.
^A.J. Clar!c, S*¥* :-%arr f and JJl, VanderVeer,
y^the^atl^al/Descnpt^n,, o? Inventprj^Gpntrol, Calculator rodela,
neport PRC~10O (>anta Uonloa, Uallf.: Planning Kesearch Corp.,
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Sine© the procurement costs, holding cost, and quantity 2 are
all constants, they can be broken out as a constant ratio, &,
and the formula becomes j
Q « k WI
The principal conclusions to toe drawn from this are: 1
1* Order quantities vary directly with the square
root of demand, and inversely with cost.
2. It is only the ratio of reorder cost to holding
cost which affects optimum operating level for all items in the
inventory, and as this ratio increases, the reorder frequency
will decrease and the average inventory will increase; or as
this ratio decreases, the reorder frequency will increase and
the investment will decrease*
Reorder Point and Safety Stootea
Another important element in the mechanism of the
inventory process is the lag in delivery of the commodity
after an order is placed or a decision is made to produce.
If demand is assumed to be known with certainty this lag
is of no consequence; all that is required is that the
orders be placed correspondingly earlier. In the case of
uncertain demand, however, the assumptions about delivery
are important, since the information about the amount
needed for ordering changes with time. Xhe existence of
lags in delivery is an essential element of inventory
holding in so far as it serves to protect against
uncertainty, for if deliveries could be made
instantaneously without extra cost, the firm could place
ureau of Supplies and Accounts, introduction to
Variable Stools Levels, p. 3-9.
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lta order© after knowing what the demand 1b rather than
before and thus avoid all possibility of penalty costs,'
This succinctly states the purpose of reorder points,
and introduces a new parameter. As previously indicated, safety
stocks are established to reduce the probability of stocicout
during leadtime to something less than 50#* This implies that
there is a cost involved with being in an out-of-stock position
when there is a requirement for material, whether the cost is
explicitly stated or not.
quantification of Parameters—Reorder Point
Quantification of factors In the determination of
reorder points revolves around two things: shortage costs and
probability of demand.
It is easy enough to understand the prlnoiple that
setting a safety stock implies some telnd of management decision
or Judgment with respect to the saxlmum sales level to be
allowed for, or the cost of service failure. But here is the
"rub": service failure cost, though real, is far from explicit.
It rarely, if ever, appears on the account ins records of the
company, except as it is hidden In extra sales or manufacturing
costs, and it is characteristically hard to define. What is
new in inventory control is not an accounting technique for
measuring service cost, but a method of self-examination by
management of the intuitive assumptions it Is making. 2 The
-*"i—-—-i —r—~"~ ""- — —...—— —-.—
^
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1 Arrow, Carl in, and Scarf, loo, olt. . p, 24.
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concept of depletion ooats or shortage coats has been considered
by other authors, alsoJ We should, therefore, examine this
concept to see what this implicit value is in the setting of
safety stocks.
In a business environment , it would certainly include
customer dissatisfaction, loss of profits, etc., as well as the
costs of special orders and manufacturing. In the military this
is referred to as expediting costs, which include special
communications, transportation, and handling. These are
certainly understandable, and even somewhat measurable in a
broad sense* A distinction must be made, however. Many authors,
In discussing safety factors, are beguiled by the mathematical
convenience of assuming that there Is a known cost of being in
backorder and derive elaborate models for selecting a safety
factor that will balance the cost of carrying inventory against
the expected cost of being in backorder. Frequently this
assumption is merely a confusion between the value of avoiding
a baekor&er and the cost of having a backorder, which may not
be the same at all. 2 This brings up a special consideration
applicable to military inventories* the shortage penalty
•
Harkowlta discusses the shortage penalty and a
methodology for approximating it in various environments.^ He
1
aitin, loo, olt.. p. 60.
Jr.G. .Brown, SM^M '^QEMmBMB^^^JmS^on
Control (New York* Rearaw-Bill Book Co. , 1 95977 pTTiTT
$84L karkowlta, Bhorta&e Penalties in fissile apare
Parts LoRiatlcs . Report EB 56 fc<P-27 (B&ntT Barbara, Calif.:
SeneralSlectrlo Co., 31 December 1938).
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points out that the shortage penalty plays a significant role
In missile spare parts logistics. In fact, the existence of
shortage penalties is the sole reason for stocking spare parts.
If there were no shortage penalties, i.e., if the missile
squadron went unpenaliaed when part shortages occurred, there
would he no purpose in spending money on spare parts, and the
spare parts logistics function would be non-existent, without
this function the missile system would be off the air a great
deal of the time, thus creating an untenable situation. Nearly
everyone concerned with supply systems readily admits the
existence of shortage penalties, but 11 fee so many of the other
parameters that enter into the inventory decision, they are not
fcnown exactly, and therefore, there is a tendency to avoid
considering them. In this case, people have avoided stating a
dollar figure because it is dependent on so many factors that
quantifying it is nearly impossible. 3ut the concept is not
completely vague—for any inventory policy there is associated
a cost and a resulting effectiveness.
This introduces another concept that is the subject of
much research today, particularly in the Havy, The term used
is Military essentiality" or "military worth." aimply stated,
this is nothing more than a realization that all items in an
inventory do not have the same importance regarding the
effectiveness of the operating forces. For example, paper and
pencils for a public information office are certainly not as
Important as a spare part for a missile system. This is Just
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common sense, but it la surprising how often this simple
concept is ignored, The very fact that effectiveness of the
Navy Supply System is measured in terms of items available
versus total demands at each supply installation of the Navy
is one indication.
The George Washington University i-oglstics Research
Project, under contract to the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts,
iJavy Department, has been exploring this area for some years,
and is the prime source of the concept within the Navy*
The concept is baaed upon the effect of the failure of
a particular equipment to the mission of the ship or aircraft;
the effect of the failure of a component within the equipment
to the operation of the equipment; and the effect of the
failure of a part within the component to the operation of the
component. As a mitigating factor, alternative sources or
methods of compensating for the failure of the part, component,
or equipment are considered. For example, if more than one
equipment is installed, the equipments are said to be redundant
if they serve the same purpose—the failure of one would not
prevent accomplishment of the mission, similarly, if a failed
part, component, or equipment can be Jury-rigged, or
cannibalized, or other alternative solution arrived at without
a replacement part, the seriousness of the failure is mitigated,
the essence of this program is to arrive at a hierarchy of




In the first report, in 1938, * there was a total
of twenty rankings based upon four solitary worth considerations
of equipments and five maintenance potentials. The most recent
study, one now being used in the Polaris program, 2 Indicates a
possible £t ?f6 classes, but through aggregation this has been
reduced to 116, of which only fifty-eight are applicable at the
shipboard level. The 116 is based on twenty-nine military worth
considerations of equipments and components times four different
part considerations.
This concept has found 2«avy-wlde adoption. The Chief
of naval Operations through his Instruction 4423. 1A, of 23
November t?62, has required its use for all ships, aircraft,
and their supporting logistic elements. This is one way for
the military to get "a handle" on the different repair parts and
materials by a logical, structural, decisive process. Referring
back to the discussion of the economist's approach in
Washington, Hitch also recognizes the responsibility of the
military services to determine the military worth of marginal
operations.
^
.ortage cost, as we use it in the Navy, is a meld of
rrilitary essentiality and the shortage penalty. A penalty
would be assumed for a particular activity, and the relative
[iiiiiim —hi -|-- 1 t—mwiit ' i
—
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V..., department of the &avy, 3ureau of Supplies and
Accounts, Military orth (The Seorge Washington University
Logistics Research Project, Washington, D.C., 24 April 1958).
2U. -., epartment of the Havy, Bureau of Supplies and
Accounts, ffp.lar;yt 3---rtt- e, -/.A^-ua ^-4^ Prpfiram (The 4WU Logistics
Research Project, Washington, B.C., J une , 1 96 1 )
.
*tittoh and ..c :ean, lac, olt. . p. 222.
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essentiality of a part would factor the penalty from to I,
Once again, preclsenesa In the stating of either of these
concepts is not necessary to be beneficial. r t is the
recognition of the relative importance of different spare parts,
together with the potential cost of stoekout that is Important.
It has been shown that there is a risk of potential
stockout during leadtiae, and that this stockout has a cost
implied. Conversely, in the holding of safety stocks to
minimize the risk of stockout, there are costs associated, which
have been described under the holding costs aspects of working
stocks. It is obvious that the higher the implied shortage
costs, the higher will be the safety stocks; and the higher
the holding costs, the lower will be the safety stocks, Safety
stocks, then, are a function _of the ratio of holding costs to
shortage costs
.
Leadtime is important to the setting of safety stocks,
for the purpose of safety stocks Is to reduce probability of
atookouts during leadtlrae. Fortunately it la easier to
quantify than some of the other parameters. There ara two
important factors to consider in estimating the leadtlme for an
Item. 1 The first is that the total leadtlme must be considered,
and the other is that the expected leadtlme ehould be based on
past procurements from a source similar to that from which
additional material will be received.
Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, An Introduction to
Variable /?took levels, p. 4~44.
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The leadtime for an item begins when it la decided that
action must be taken to order, purchase , requisition, manufac-
ture, or repair an item, and ends when the material is received,
The time in weeks from the action dates to the receipt dates on
various stools records is generally an accurate statement of
past total leadtimes.
The total leadtime for an item depends on the type of
action taken to replenish the item. Thus, the time to
replenish an item by repairing existing stock may be less than
the time to replenish by requisition from a supporting supply
activity. In estimating the total leadtime for an anticipated
replenishment, it is necessary to determine the probable type
of replenishment and then analyse the leadtimes for past
replenishments of the same type, Generally, averages can be
calculated for different items, and It is not necessary to
make a calculation for each item with each replenishment.
far the most Important factor affecting the reorder
point and safety stocks, is demand. The preponderance of low
demand, high variability items in the military inventory has
been discussed, and indicates the problem of attempting to
anticipate requirements.
The very idea of demand during leadtime, discussed as
the basis for safety stocks, denotes the necessity for arriving
at some idea of average demands, but how much history should be
used to arrive at this average? Oenerally, the longer the
historical period the more that fluctuations will be smoothed
out, but it must be noted that too much history may be as bad
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as not enough, for current effects on the particular Item, such
as changing equipment populations, may be negated. It has been
determined through study that &avy supply predictions should
use a two-year base.
In a period of phasing new equipments Into the service,
or of phasing old equipments out, we experience trends In demand
which the simple average does not adequately recognize. There
are two methods of compensating for trend: the "Least iquares*1
prediction and a weighted average of demand. The first method
fits a trend line through a group of observed data to project
a prediction Into the future along that trend line. The
objection to this approach Is that It Is complicated,
computationally, although It has been used with some degree of
success at the Electronics supply Office of the Kavy. The
weighted average method has been used for some years at the
Uaval Ordnance Supply office, and is a method of assigning
weights to the periods of demand used, with the most recent
period receiving the most weight.
Recognizing that extreme fluctuations In random demand
exist, particularly for low average demand items, In order to
utilize trend compensating methods of demand prediction guide-
lines must be established to differentiate between actual trend
and random demand. This problem Is similar to that of quality
control on a production line. As stated earlier, servo-




The use of averages Introduces the orux of the
discussion on demand, and that Is probability theory.
For every average of demand over le&dtlae, It is
possible to construct a probability distribution table based on"
observed demands—empirical data. For each one of these
distribution tables, a cumulative distribution can be
constructed based on the probability of z or more demands
occurring. Thus there would be a 1,00 probability of aero or
mors demands, something less for one or more, etc. The risk
of stoc^out that has been referred to would be the sum of the
probabilities in the "tail* of the cumulative distribution
higher than any particular value of z selected, wherein z
would be the reorder point for that average.
This is impractical when considering any group of items,
so the use of mathematical probability distributions is
utilized. This, of course, is a set of standard tables which
accomplish the same purpose as constructed tables, but in
effect, smooth out the "bumps*' and "valleys" In actual observed
occurrences. By the us© of these tables, a supply manager need
only ascertain the degree of risk he is willing to take on
being out of stock on each item; go to the appropriate table
for the average under consideration; and select the figure
associated with the probability of that risk. That quantity
la th®n his reorder point in the same manner as it would be
with empirical tables. Figures 7 and 8 illustrate this idea,

















Fig. 7.—Hypothetical Probability Distribution
100%
Mean
Fig. 8.—Hypothetical Cumulative Probability Disti -.but ion
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applied the "Chi-square" test of bast fit, and have ascertained
that three standard probability distributions best approximate
actual occurrences. These are* the normal distribution for
large demand items ; the Polsson distribution for medium demand
items? and the negative binomial distribution for low demand
items, 1
The question to be answered, however, is where in the
tail of these theoretical distributions do we accept the risfc?
M people advocate the use of a standard degree of risk for
all items in an inventory by use of a factor of so many
standard deviations from the mean, 2 but this is not wholly
satisfactory, because of the military essentiality parameter.
T^e,.Formula Apjproj^Jfeo^Reorder Vo%n%* and ~a?»tf/ Stocks
The point has been made that safety stocks are a
function of the ratio of holding costs to shortage costs. They
are also a function of the frequency of orders in a year, for
the more often that an Item is ordered, the more often it is
exposed to the probability of •toc'r.out during lead time. The
formula approach, then, becomes one of minimising total annual
costs of holding costs and shortage costs, in the ease manner
that holding cost and procurement costs were optimized for
working stools. The tfavy'a prime contractor la the area of
i-rniii iirini iiTHiini-" m i Tir un 1—in r " " "" '—' " • ,l n — i — n r n i .1 ruinrn- rm/.niir ..lumun n .1 11.1 j ijl.hu i 11 ,_.
1
y,&*j -epart&ent of the Havy, Jureau of Supplies and
Accounts, Prpy.kslojaj&g; 3ubooBjnUtexJ]&BgX&» (Advance Copy)
{ vvashington , B»0 #l 18 May 1 9b 2 ) *
hitlu, Iqq< Q%\ft p. 43.
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Inventory control research haa utilised dynamic programming
techniques to arrive at what In essence la a V9icy simple formula
for ascertaining the maximum degree of rials of atoeicouta during
leadtlme we should be willing to takes*
Probability a (i^o^d^; Coaft) (HQorder ^u^tlty)




It can be aeen that the formula recognises the ratio of holding
coat and shortage cost, as well as the frequency of reorder.
The actual solving of this expression was expressed as an
optimisation of the combined reorder costs, holding costs, and
shortage costs. In this paper they have been separated for
simplicity of presentation.
Implications for Management
Utilisation of scientific inventory management
techniques givea management a tool for controlling the
effectiveness of its Inventory policies which it never had
before. As in any form of scientific management, the
structuring of decisions requires management to analyse the
interrelationships of parameters that enter into decisions.
This analysis quickly indicates to the manager which factors
are relatively more important than others, and allows him to
concentrate hie attention and efforts where they will produce
the most benefit.
'Claris, £arr, and VandsrVeer, loc. olt. . p. 11.
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Attempts to introduce the concept of scientific
inventory management have met with much resistance from
operating personnel. This resistance is engendered partly by
a lack of full comprehension of the concepts involved, but
probably snore from the difficulties involved in quantifying
parameters. The lack of ability to be precise in assigning
values to such factors as the cost to hold, causes many to
react against the validity of the entire concept. It is
encumbent upon managerial personnel who desire to utilize
concepts such as this to; first, ensure that their
subordinates are aware of what the concept is and what it means
,
Secondly, they must demonstrate that errors in parameter values
do not engender the same degree of error in optimum policies,
and of more importance, that the estimation of parameters
individually for manipulation by a logical mathematical
approach gives more consistent decisions which are in
themselves jsuch better than the intuitive approach to inventory
control. The very fact that the order quantity is a result of
a square root function, and the reorder point is the result of
a probability distribution function indicates that the results
of decisions are not linear with the variability of the
parameters
•
One of the major benefits to management is that they
now have the ability to project the results of a decision, and
to make decisions on the basis of those projections or
simulations. The Xonte Carlo simulation technique uses tables

74
of random numbers as substitutes for actual demand; numbers
are taken from the table, and through Iterative procedures In a
computer are applied to probability distributions to arrive at
random demands. This figure Is then applied against an
tn^entorj isodel set up on the basis of a management decision and
the issue is simulated, along with reorders, when necessary, the
arrival of material, and stockouts. in a few minutes* time the
action of an inventory for a period of weeks, months, or even
years can be simulated
.
Through tho use of models and by varying parameter
values, management is able to make decisions with a better
knowledse of the consequences of those decisions . In inventory
management the manager is concerned with what level of
effectiveness or customer service he can attain without undue
increase in the costs of managing the inventory. Figure 9 Is
an example of how this can be accomplished, 3y varying
parameters In a simulation process, several curves such as
shown can be derived, and the most economical one chosen, and
those parameters assigned to decisions, within the Uavy this
device has been used with some success.' The most Important
thing to recognize is that it gives the manager the ability to
set a policy with a much higher decree of assurance that this
1
, ;, ftl&teab and *,J, GradwoaX, Reuort on Phase A .
EplWfiU n™ ^Qjrtrol ayaftftF i-pf&BfrloB oan^emsnt Etudy,
Technical Mlitary Planning Operation Report R50TKP-6 (oanta
Barbara, calif.: General Electric Co., 30 January 1959), p. 18.
;i ntosh, Jnproy^ent of Looa^ .Jupply ^eclsfrpn,
Huleg at a;;G . Keport PRC-132 (Santa Monica, Calif.: Planning






Fig. 9.—Relationship of Cost to Effectiveness
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polloy will be consistently followed, and It gives him more
flexibility. If hie funds are out, for example, he can increase
the funding constraint or time preference rate to reduce the
amount of inventory that will be held and at the same time
realize that he is increasing the risk: of stoekout. The point
is that he will know what the results of a decision will be.
In introducing new programs, most of them fail when
something unanticipated happens. Inventories may build up
unexpectedly, or the order rate may increase more than
anticipated, and soon everyone is happy to return to the
intuitive approach, * One way to avoid this is to analyze
present procedures and to introduce new methods in a way that
will assure some improvement without attempting the optimum at
the beginning.
1 Welch, loc olt,, p. 17,

CHAPTER V
THE CONCEPT APPLIED TO THE AFLOAT I&VEKTORY
Operational Keadlneas 1
The only reason In being of the entire military
logistics complex is to ensure the combat or operational
readiness of the combat forces. In Chapter II the point was
made that the purpose of inventories is to buy time, and that
in a military inventory the time that is being bought is
operational time of weapon systems. .Yet in the past, this
point has been only dimly conceived, and even then not too much
importance has been given to it. It has only been recently
that decisions regarding inventory control have begun to be
structured into a logical arrangement, whereby the end purpose
is explicitly considered.
The concept of operational readiness is essential to
an understanding of the reason for inventories aboard Navy
ships. The ^avy is built around a number of different weapon
elements, i.e., aircraft carriers, destroyers, submarines, etc.,
1 The constructs of this section were, for the most part,
derived from an article, *T ilitary Essentiality," by Commander
H.F. Kille, ;" apply Corps, u. . ..vy, in Monthly Newsletter—
Magazine, .of the Mavy Supply Qoroa . Vol. XVI, Uo. 5 '{'.arch,
'
1963) . It is the opinion of the writer that Commander ills
has one of the finest conceptual minds of anyone in the Havy
regarding the meaning of supply support. For this reason the





each with a mission falling within the mission of the I.'avy as a
whole. However, one factor peculiar to the <Mavy as
differentiated from the other services, is that each ship is
capable of performing more than one mission, particularly in
the destroyer force, where the missions assigned may be anti-
airoraft, anti-submarine, or shore bombardment in nature. At
any time the operational readiness of a ship 13 its capability
of performing a particular mission that has been designed into
the ship, and the Commanding officer in reporting his ship
ready for sea must consider the interrelationship of the various
missions of which his ship is capable, aa well as the primary
missionCs) assigned to him at the moment.
The ability of a ship to carry out a particular mission
depends upon its ability to perform a number of major functions,
eaoh of which can be thought of as carried out h^f a system.
Each of these systems in turn la dependent upon the performance
of sub-systems, which together comprise the parent system.
Commander, Cruiser-Destroyer Force, United States Atlantic
Fleet and his staff have suggested that the destroyer as a
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Using a guided missile frigate as an example, there is
a primary mission of anti-aircraft defense of a task force;
however, within the mission capability of the frigate is an
anti-submarine capability, as well ae surface or shore
bombardment of a limited scope. Within the weapon delivery
system of the ant i-aircraft defense mission are the sub-
systems of a guided missile system and a gunfire system.
ithln the guided missile system are sub- sub-systems of missile
launching system, fire control system, and the missile itself,
ithin the fire control system, the most complicated, perhaps*
is the missile radar, which tracks the target and provides
electronic guidance to guide the missile to its target;
several computers to correlate the action of the radar with
changes in target course, speed, etc.; and weapons control
equipment which controls the operations of the entire guided




This structuring of the weapon system can be continued
down through the equipments comprising the sub-sub-systems to
the components comprising the equipments and the parts
comprising the components, so that eventually there is a
relationship between mission performance and parts performance,
figure to indicates the hierarohlal relationships of the
mobility system. In considering the ability of the ship to
perform its m las Ion it Is important to recognize that the
operational readiness is a factor of the systems acting in
combination, and the performance of the sub-systems down to the
components is also one of interrelationship of things acting in
combination*
Once the hierarohlal relationships of the equipments
within a ship are recognized, it then become® necessary to
determine what the levels of performance are for each of the
systems within the ship-system* There can be many levels of
performance; therefore, judgment must be used to reduce the
alternatives for selection to a relatively few significant ones,
.or example, In the propulsion sub* system of the mobility
system, there is an Infinite number of possibilities, ranging
from o imots to the maximum speed designed In the ship.
However, there is little advantage to be gained from
differentiating between minute changes in speed capability.
\ IT has divided the alternatives into three groups:
































































2. Any conditions leas than the above but greater
than those described below*
3. Capable of less than standard speed.
This Is an example of the type of judgment that oust be made in
determining the operational readiness of a ship. An extension
into the field of jaissilry might require u, consideration of
rate of fire of missiles or seconds of degrees in computer or
radar oscillation.
aen the variables fflqp each system are determined, it
is then possible to arrange a matrix as follows
i
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This chart rather crudely depicts the different states that this
ship theoretically could be in, ranging from the best state,
when all equipments are operating at designed performance, of
A1, 31, 01, B1, Et to the worst of A4, 03, C4, D3, K2, when all
equipments are down. There is a total combination of 288
combinations of states of readiness (4x3x4x3x2). These
can be put in a ranging order to describe differing degrees of
readiness, and as such would constitute an index of readiness,
However, to put all ships on the same basis the rank order
should be transcribed to a percentage basis so that 1O0f
readiness would be meaningful to all concerned. Commander Mills
suggests that the relationship is not linear, but rather
exponential, and i» fact, exponential scaling of the hierarchy
was used in construction of the allowance list for the Polaris
program, as will be described later.
An Important factor to note is that the level of
performance of the systems, the sub-systems, etc., down to the
parts can be done by those In the command structure best fitted
to determine their importance. The Commanding Officer, for
example, would describe levels of performance of the systems,
the department heads of the sub-systems, division officers of
the sub- sub-systems, down to the petty officer responsible for
maintaining each component describing the levels of importance
of each part to component.
Another important factor is that the performance of
each level of the hierarchy is dependent upon or mitigated by
the importance of the elements of the level just below it, and
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that there is a cumulative effect. A part that was 100
essential to Its component, which In turn was 100* essential to
its equipment, on up to the system, would have as much
essentiality to the operational readiness of the ship as the
weapon system Itself,
Recognizing the Interrelationships of the various
systems, etc., to the operational readiness of the ship, the
question arises as to what this means in terms of supply
management. The answer is in terms of failures of different
parts In different components of equipments. As the equipments
are operated, parts fall, they are repaired, operated some more,
and other parts or the same ones fall again. Sometimes the
parts that fail are In atoofc aboard ship and sometimes they are
not.
This cyclical process in the life of a component or
equipment can be conceptualized by breaking it into three main
time periods. There is the mean ( average) time between
failures, mean repair time, and mean time waiting for parts.
The sum of these is the total operational time of the
equipment; the ratio of mean time between failures to the total
operational time is the effectiveness, "up" time, or reliability
of the equipment. It should be noted that the design engineer
designs the equipment to be as reliable as possible, i.e., he
*0#0«, Department of the l^avy, Bureau of Supplies and
Accounts, Assistant Chief for Research and Development,
ilitary Essentiality Coding," Qtf &otea (Washington, D.G* 9
22 October 1962), p. 2-5*
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tries to extend the mean time between failures to as long a
period as possible* On the other hand, the mean repair time Is
a function of how well the equipment can he maintained--how
easy is It to "trouble- shoot" the equipment, how difficult is
it to replace failed parts, etc? To a certain extent this,
too, is a design feature of the equipment, and should be
considered oy the engineer concurrently with reliability*
Another engineering consideration which reduces both the mean
repair time and the mean time waiting for parts la redundancy
of equipments, which is to say, that ®or& than one equipment
performing the same function is designed Into the ship to reduce
the sum of mean repair time and mean time waiting for parts to
zero, as far as operational readiness of the ship is concerned.
This is done quote often in the case of highly esssntial sub-
systems, and provides some latitude in spar® parts stocking.
To synthesize the concept of the effect of performance
level of the systems on the operational readiness of the ship
with the concept of the cycle of component failure, it can be
seen that as parts fall, the operational readiness of the ship
is reduced by varying degrees, depending upon the importance of
the part, and the time it takes to repair the equipment; the
repair time is a function both of actual ropalr time and time
required to obtain a spare part. This, then, is the crux of
this thesis; funds available for stocking spare parts on board
ship should be spent on those parts which will reduce time
waiting, for parts in the areas where operational readiness will
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be Increased to the maximum extent. This is the time we buy
with Bhipboard inventories,
KitUfru'y Essentially .Codftqg;
One of the greatest strides forward that has been taken
in applying structured decis ion-mateing concepts to afloat
inventory management has been the implementation of the :llltary
Essentiality Coding Program, which was developed through The
George Washington University Logistics Research Project, and
was briefly described in the previous chapter. The purpose of
Military Essentiality Coding (MKC) is to establish a basis
whereby personnel of ships and aircraft can formally evaluate
the relative military importance of on-board equipments, The
military importance assigned to an equipment will be determined
by relating the function of the equipment to the accomplishment
of assigned amissions. * The immediate purpose is to relate
repair part support to the ability of a ship or aircraft to
perform its slsslon(a). In other words, KM is the application
of the concept of operational readiness as described in the
preceding section.
The original allowance list study on KM was commenced
in 1957, and applied to submarines, the LT3S Tlru, a World War
II fleet type, in particular. The purpose of this study was to
develop techniques for making determinations regarding the
*t?«8M Department of the Wavy. Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations, QPHAV Instruction 442?. 1 A (Washington, D.C.,
23 November 1962), p. 1.
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rang® and depth of Items to b© Included on shipboard allowance
lists. Resulting from this study were technical, papers
explaining the results of Intensive research in two areas: the
development of a technique for determining the military
essentiality of repair parts, and allowance list models. These
technical pspers were reviewed by the Special Projects Cffloe
in April, 1960* The Special Projects Office was interested in
furthering the results of this early research effort for
application to the Polaris submarine allowance list program.
The results of this extension of the research program are
described here, for the program developed is now being applied
Havy-wide. 1
On© of the major problems in the development of optimum
military inventory control systems has been the need of a
aeasure of t_# relative importance of supplying one item instead
of another. It had been generally rt9f»g&iftftd that some items
were more important than others, but no way of objectively
measuring and comparing the military essentiality of each Item
had been explicitly used in inventory control computations.
The research study was aimed at developing a technique
for making military essentiality ©valuations. This study, the
most comprehensive ever initiated in the problem area, obtained
military essentiality data on some 3,000 equipments and
components and 5t,000 repair part applications for the U
•ieors© Washington (S&88»598)« The military essentiality study
in ii
1
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included the active participation of personnel of the Bureau of
hips, Special Projects Office, Polaris contractors, officer
personnel of 3ubmarine Squadron 14, and the 088 George
Washington and uss Patrick Henry,
The immediate purpose of the study was to develop a
military essentiality measure for use in allowance list
preparation. The goal, initially, was to Improve the Navy's
capability for providing allowance lists maximizing the
endurance of ships in consideration of budget and space
constraints. It is important to note, however, that MM in
itself does not provide the data required. It is Just one of
the input parameters to provide the solution; however, for the
first time it la being explicitly considered in the decisions
that must be made in stocking a shipboard inventory.
The military worth of a repair part is based on a
consideration of part-to-component-to-equipment-to-miss ion
relationships. Repair part failures are examined in a series
relationship—that is to say that the failure of a given repair
part is not looked upon in isolation, but rather is dependent
upon its application to a specific component, to a specific
equipment, and to a specific ship's mission. In other words,
it is the synthesis of operational readiness and saterlal
failure discussed in the preceding section.
Initiation of the military essentiality study was
dependent upon obtaining a complete and accurate list of the
installed equipments sttft components of the USS George Washington,
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These were subjeoted to evaluation by three Independent
participants: the eonotraotars, technical bureau personnel,
and fleet personnel* The purpose of obtaining multiple answers
was, first, to determine if there was a particular bias from
any one of the participants and, second, to obtain a measure of
consistency.
The questionnaire for equipments and components
Included a statement of a typical patrol for a Polaris
submarine » The most significant aspect of the statement was
the requirement that the submarine stay on station independent
of supply support for the full period of the patrol, and that
in effect, the submarine would have to endure the loss of the
function being performed by that failed component for the full
length of the patrol. The mission requirement of independent
operation for the full length of a patrol provides a measure
of the seriousness of the failures being evaluated.
The format of the questionnaires for evaluation of
equipments and for components was similar* The essential
difference was that the one for equipments was concerned with
the effects of failures of the mission of the ship, and the
one for components was concerned with the effects of failures
on the parent equipment.
The questionnaires were divided into three sections.
The first has to do with mission effect. In this case the
participant assumes the simultaneous failure of the sum total
of equipments installed to accomplish a particular function.
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For example, if three units of a particular motor are installed
the assumption is that all three have failed simultaneously.
The questionnaire requires the participant to render a decision
on the effect that this simultaneous failure will have on the
mission capability of the ship, ihree choices are available;
they range from failures which necessitate the immediate
termination of the patrol action, to failures which have a
negligible effect, The possible situations are indicated by
numeric codes 2, 1, or 0, respectively. The participant
determines which situation applies for each equipment/component
in the study and checks the code nuii'oer applicable to his
decision.
A code 2 decision indicates a failure, the seriousness
of which would cause the ship to break off the patrol and
immediately return to port for repairs. A code 1 decision
indicates a failure which would introduce a calculated risk
into the accomplishment of the mission; the risk would be
restrictive in terms of the operational capability of the ship.
However, the ship would be able to stay on station. A code
decision indicates a failure which would have minimal effect
on the accomplishment of the assigned mission.
The second question has to do with redundancy, which
is the availability of duplicate installations of tne same
equipment and component, which, assuming the failure of the
prime unit, can permit continued performance of the function
of the prime unit. As in the previous question, three choices,
similarly coded, are available to the participant. A code 2
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decision Indicates that there is no redundancy, I.e., there is
only one unit installed, or if multiple units are installed, the
failure of only the prime unit would toe as serious as if all
units failed simultaneously. A code 1 decision indicates that
if the prime unit failed, the surviving units permit continued
operation, out with some loss of effectiveness. A code
decision reflects the case where the surviving units permit
continued operation with no loss in effectiveness.
The third question relates to the availability of
alternatives or emergenoy methods to continue operations in the
event of the failure of the prime unit. An example might toe
the case of an emergency power generator which is installed
for emergency purposes, as the name implies. Jury-rigging of
substitute operational capability is another case. The choices
and coding for decisions are the same as in the case of
redundancy of duplicate equipments
In the case of the part questionnaires, only one
answer—from technicians at the inventory control points—was
obtained. Part essentiality is determined toy technical judgment
in two areas. The first is whether or not the part is
installable by ships force under routine operating conditions
with the tools and talent available. The second area of
Judgment is the effect of the failure on the parent component,
and then only whether the effect is of major degradation of
operation or minor degradation. These Judgments are reported
toy four codes (1 through 4). t and 3 indicate inatallatoility
by ships force, t and 2 indicate major effect, while 3 and 4
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are minor. It can be seen that this decision brings together
the reliability and maintenance policies ostensibly considered
by the design engineer when first designing the equipments
•
The MECs resulting from the study were ranged in order
of importance. It can be seen that the number of classes was
rather large. There were a total of twenty- seven equipment
classes (three decisions with three choices each; 3^) and
twenty-seven component classes, or 729 total equipment/component
combinations, Multiplied by the four part classifications, this
made a total of 2,916 total possible ranks. This was obviously
unworkable. The small differences are comparable to the
difference between minute changes in speed oapaoility used as
an example In the discussion of operational readiness and levels
of performance. It was, therefore, necessary to combine
classes. The result was twenty-nine equipment/component classes
times four part classes for a total of 116 liECs; however, since
only two part classes were applicable to shipboard maintenance
capabilities, the nusber of NB0t considered for shipboard
inventories was reduced to twenty-nine times two, or fifty-eight,
These were MECs 116 through 39 In descending order of
importance. Class 116 is comprised of those parts coded 1
(major effect) and equipment/component 222 222. From this
discussion it can be seen that a method was developed, as
operationally feasible, by whloh the parts in a shipboard
inventory could be ranfced in order of their importance to the





Although the study Indicated a high degree of
consistency in the results from the three individual sources of
estimation, a study of these results indicated that perhaps
more speoifle criteria were required for evaluations purposes, 1
The Chief, ureau of Ships, noted certain discrepancies:
1, Component coding
a* Components of equal importance to the
ship's mission were assigned to different ; EC classes.
b. Minor components were assigned to a higher
class than the major component in which it was installed or
which it served,
c. Components were assigned to incorrect K£C
classes because of the grouping techniques that were used,
d. Components in separate but interdependent
systems were assigned differing MEC ratings,
2. Parts coding
a. Farts having an identical functional use
in different components were designated as having major
import&nee in one component and minor importance in another,
b. Farts in both categories of part
essentiality were often incorrectly designated,
Hecognlfcing that any new systen has its difficulties in
the initial implementation stages, certain significant results
came forth from the study. It was found that in the equipment/
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component evaluations that only 4! of the components were of
the highest military worth, I.e., MSC 116, 11$ were considered
to toe of high worth? l«e., KEG 105-115, and the balance, 85
were of low worth. Similarly In the application of the part
evaluation to the above, 4% were in M10 116; 7% were high
worth, i.e., K1C 110-115; 76$ were low worth, i.e., NIC 88-
106| and \y$ were of the lowest military worth, i.e., K£C
59-87.
This study confirmed the previous studies, in that
relatively few of the repair parts applicable to a ship's
system have hi&h military worth, and conversely, a majority
have relatively low essentiality. This enables the ship to
pinpoint those items which are vital to operating missions. In
effect, it provides the Navy with a realistic and specific
definition of insurance items.
The use of military Essentiality Coding was directed
by the Chief of Naval Operations to be implemented fleet-wide. 1
It is significant to note that the implementing directive
stated that for systems presently installed in the fleet ALL
PA;.. ILL HAVE THE ESSENTIALITY 01- THE PAKESiT EQUIPMENT/
COMPONENT. In other words, a method is now available to all
shipboard supply managers to evaluate the importance of the
items of their inventories through a relatively simple coding
program for the components listed in their CQ.iAL. Of course,
the coding would be done by the technical personnel of the ship,
in. i Mm " I iii n aii mm —mi , .,,
1 Chief of i*aval Operations, loc. clt .
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but nevertheless, the study described herein Indicated that
this is a relatively simple task that is not too time-
consuming. It Is far simpler to code 2,780 components than
51»000 individual parts.
The Optimum COPAL
The so-called Optimum COSAL was the result of the
second part of the study which developed military essentiality
as a concept. It is the application of military essentiality
to the allowance list problem, plus the economic considerations
of cost in terms of dollars and storage space. It is the first
step toward application of scientific inventory management
techniques to the shipboard inventory problem.
The Optimum COSAL Program was a large-scale simulation
program utilising the complete range of potential allowance
list candidates which was then applicable to the UBS George
Washington. The purpose of the simulations was to test various
formulations of allowance lists, which in general attempted to
maximize the strategic value of shipboard inventories, subject
to the aforementioned constraints of dollars and space. 1
Independent of which particular Optimum COSAL
formulation was used, all of them made explicit use of the
military essentiality information, price and cube data,
technicians* usage estimates or usage data if available, and
population data (the number of times a part is installed, and
1




where It la installed) • All formulations considered all items
simultaneously competing t°r spaoe and dollar value, Independent
of controlling inventory control point. All the item
characteristics, such as military essentiality, price, and cube,
etc., were considered simultaneously for decisions as to
stocking, .ost important of all is the fact that in deciding
whether or not to stoolc a quantity, specific consideration was
given to the item in terms of space and dollar values relative
to the expected value of the item for the mission. The early
phases of the simulation program tested the manageability of
the various formulations as well as their effectiveness.
Various assumptions to be utilized in the simulation program
were also tested. The final formulations for these simulations
were two models, one termed the ordinal model and the other the
cardinal model,
*
The basic technique of both models was to apply
protection levels against probability distributions of demand
(or usage) in order to arrive at allowance list quantities.
They both used the negative binomial distributions of demand
sizes, in keeping with analyses of historical demand patterns.
fftllil the cardinal model was finally selected for application
to the Fleet Jallistlc Missile Submarine allowance list
program, the ordinal model need be described but briefly, and
that in terms of differences from the cardinal model.




models. The first was In terms of treatment of military
essentiality. The ordinal model treated one M1G olass as only
more (or less) important than another class, while the cardinal
•sodel ranked the classes on a relative value or weight assigned
as a result of exponential scaling of the ft£C categories. The
second difference was in the protection level, The ordinal
model stipulated a particular protection level for each EC
category, while the cardinal model computed the protection
level as a function of price, cube, and weighted military
essentiality.
The cardinal model computes a protection level based
on the cost in terms of space and dollar value of the item as
well as its essentiality. There are three decisions to be made
in doing this: choosing a price multiplier or weight to be
associated with the unit price of all items (since all items
are being considered as simultaneously competing for dollars
and space), choosing a cube multiplier, and choosing a scaling
factor for exponentially ranking the military essentiality of
the various items. It should be mentioned at this point that
the protection level is the complement of the risk of stockout
during leadtime, which has been described as the tail of the
cumulative probability distribution.
The formula for computing the protection level is: 1
I
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^p =s Lagrangian price multiplier
^ c m Lagranglan cube multiplier
P Unit price
C Unit cube
e m Uaperlan nuaber, 2,718
x s exponential seal ins constant
before proceeding further with a discussion of the
cardinal model and its operations, an analogy must be made to
the basic reorder point formula advocated in the previous
chapter, First, the protection level for the cardinal model
1b the length of the submarine patrol period. It presumes a
failure on the first day and an inability to replenish until the
end of the patrol. This Is procurement leadtlme under another
guise, secondly, the Lagranglan multipliers serve the same
function as holding cost; however, in the case of the cardinal
model the implied holding cost of storage space constraint is
explicitly manipulated as a separate function of holding cost.
The third point of similarity is that the denominator of the
ratio serves the same -pnrpo&Q as shortage cost. Therefore, it
can be seen that this is the basic reorder point formula of
holding cost to shortage cost, without the latter being stated
in monetary fori*. The exponential sealing of MSC serves to
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relate essentiality to performance level on an to 100.-S scale,
v.lth the ability to change the values of the three
constants (the two multipliers and the scaling factor), it is
apparent that a muititide of protection levels can be obtained
for each item, and a multitude of allowance lists, none of
which can b© considered as jyig optimum. After &ueh testing a
series of different results was obtained. The one which
appeared best to serve the purpose was a rather subjective
selection, but was done by experienced officers, and the final
selection was made by the Director, Technical division, Special
Projects Office— a Hear Admiral**
The values of the constants used in the cardinal model
selected for implementation were .00363 for the price multiplier,
.000100 for the cube multiplier, and # 15 for the exponential
scaling factor. 2 This resulted in an allowance list that had
basically the same number of Items as the regular COBAL)
however, the overall cube requirement was reduced by 16;f;
overall dollar value of the allowance list was reduced a little,
but vai basically the same; but the depth, or average quantity
of each item was raised by a factor of 4. At the same time, 84,!
of the cube available for inventory storage was ultimately
consumed by material from MEC 100-116, the high essentiality
'Personal interview with Lieutenant Commander i).W.
Whelan, SC, United states Mavy t Special Assistant to Assistant
for aterial Support, Technical Division, Special Projects
Office, Navy Department, Washington, l>.u., I arch, 1963.




material, and the dollar value required for stocking of those
•9 was more than doubled.*
These results are not extraordinary; they are what
should be expected from the application of scientific inventory
management decisions. Available funds are utilised in a manner
that will increase the performance level or operational
readiness of the ship* The large amount of emphasis placed on
the highest essentiality items is a result of the particular e
exponential factor used.
aluations of the cardinal model have shown that many
items applicable to highly essential equipments or components
are backed into MEG 88 because of redundancy or alternatives
that are present* Resulting from the computation of protection
levels as a function of the three constants (or constant-
variables) » many of these Items are dropped off of the
allowance list altogether. To overcome this by changing the
slope of the essentiality ran&ing curve, all items are raised
In essentiality through exponential manipulation* This in turn
would present other problems of including even more of the high
essentiality items than at present, to the further detriment of
protection of class 83. To the extent that this problem has
been explored so far, the Immediate reaction might be that this
is all well and good—that this is what the scheme is designed
to accomplish. However, one major fault of the Optimum cosal
X .JP2JJ e
Personal interview with HP. J. Qumenicfe, Kerch. 1963.
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as exemplified in th© cardinal modal is that iters© are dropped
frois allowance lists through the computation of protection
levels frof
p
re any consideration is read* of axpacted demand for
the iterc«l The Chief, bureau of Ships, was particularly
concerned over this, since 93 2% of th© BuShlps equipments on
board fall Into classes 88 to 93
.
2
The writer has arrived at th© conclusion that the
relative ranking of the KSC classes by the exponential scaling
factor is as arbitrary as the ranging in the ordinal model,
wherein one class was considered as only score or less important
than another without considering degree. If time and effort
are to be expended in assigning MSCe to items susceptible to
inclusion In the shipboard Inventory, then it seeiss that a
little more effort Bight be expended in explicitly considering
the relative importance of each class and assigning the
percentage of essentiality on thoo© explicit considerations* To
state the case In another way, a correlation can be made between
and performance level; and an explicit statement of
performance level can be sad© on a scale of 0% to 10C . If this
is done, there should be little cause for criticism if item© are
dropped from the allowance list because of low ranking*
The other side of the question, dealing with disregard











*Personal interviews with Lieutenant Commander D,
.
slan and ,'r, J. Qusenlck,




Introduces the observation that there la no provision In the
COftAL for variable wording stocks as discussed
previously. Xf the allowance list as developed were to be
rigidly adhered to, then a wording stock level of whatever the
patrol period happened to be would be required for all items.
Assuming that the patrol is ninety days, It means that at the
end of each patrol, ninety days worth of stock for each Item
experiencing demand would be ordered from the submarine tender.
This concept went out of military supply systems with the
battleship! t Is not efficient, whether you consider it
explicitly or implicitly in determination of stock levels.
Although economic order quantity quantifications are formal In
nature, the conoept Is one that the newest storekeeper soon
adopts implicitly in his operations. Kore of low-cost items
are stocked than of high-cost Items* I any variations can be
made to the classic feOQ formula expressed in this paper. To
apply to the Solaris program it may be necessary to make order
quantities in terms of number of patrol periods, although this
is not necessary, if the order point considers stocks on hand
plus on-order. In that case the full reorder point stock: level
Is carried in the allowanoe and orders are generated caring the
cruise as demands require. As a result, more than one order
would be placed for the same item upon return from the cruise.
The point to be m*&* is that working stocks or ©eonoaic order
quantities provide efficiency in utilization of personnel and
operating funds, while the reorder point, inoludins safety




While this ia important from a viewpoint of efficiency,
it does not answer the question of items being dropped off the
Optimum COiAL before demand is considered, although there is a
relationship. Referring again to the conoept advanoed in the
previous chapter, it is noted that the frequency of reorder
was proposed as a function of protection required, the point
being that the more frequently an item was reordered, the more
frequently it was exposed to stockout during leadtime;
therefore, the higher degree of protection was required. If
SOQ was considered in the Optimum C03AL, the order quantity
would be calculated first. Under these circumstances it is
possible to have an order quantity calculated for the allowance
list, and the reorder point (or protection level) reduced to
zero. Under this concept, material would be stocked for on
board repair purposes, as a funotion of efficiency and economy,
but the protection level would still reflect operational
readiness. The "<rery fact that a quantity was calculated for
working stock purposes would make the ltes sore likely to be
reflected in the protection level quantities that are calculated.
In any event, by implementation of the Optimum OOSAL,
great strides are being made in making the shipboard inventory
management situation a more efficient one, based on explicitly
stated decision rules, H* system is perfect in its inception;
much work remains to be done, but the very fact that the various
problem areas are recognized indicates that there is hope for
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their early solution, The next step is to implement the Optimum
COSAL program for all ships of the fleet, not Just the high
priority Fleet Ballistic fissile Submarines.
The i\\qqI Concept^
ftoiae work has already been done in applying these
concepts to ships of the :iavy, other than in the Fffll program.
Foremost in their application Is the realisation that allowance
lists as provided at the present time are no more than
engineering estimates of requirements, and that little, if any,
effort is directed toward revising allowance lists after the
original introduction of the equipments into the fleet. The
responsibility for determining stock levels, including
protection levels, rests with the Supply Officer of the
Individual ship,
Application of the concepts advocated in this paper can
be approached from two points of view: that of the individual
ship and that of the type commander. (A type commander has all
ships of a similar type, i.e., destroyers, aircraft carriers,
etc., within a fleet under his administrative responsibility,
which includes funding responsibility.) The points that have
been developed in this paper, so far, are directed toward the
former, yet there is great potential for the type commander
in using these techniques to achieve optimum utilisation of the
funds available to him for financing operations of his ships.
These funds can be separated into two areas, generally.
One element of the appropriation is funds available for day-to-
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day operations, which is allocated among the ships of the type
for obligation purposes, $his Is referred to as the operating
target amount or OPTAR, The other element consists of those
funds available to the type commander for financing the supply
overhaul that each ship undergoes every two to three years t
concurrently with the regular shipyard overhaul, to correct
equipment deficiencies. During this period the materials in
the ship's inventory are off-loaded, and using the assistance
of shore-based experts, the materials are Identified and
inventoried, and stock records are corrected to reflect actual
balances on hand. These balances are compared with the
allowance quantities reflected in the C03AL, Lists are then
prepared stating the quantit las that are either excess to
allowance or deficient therefrom. The problem whleh faces the
type oommander is that of determining how many of the shortages
can be funded, and which particular Items should be procured
and to what depth.
The problem can be approached by way of a matrix.
Horizontally items are ranked by MEG; vertically they are
ranked by dollar value of usage. Obviously, the highest degree
of attention should be given to those Items with both high
usage and high essentiality, 3y analysing the shortages
appearing on deficiency listings by both money value of usage
and degree of essentiality, much more meaningful decisions can
be made by the type commander. The stipulation by the Chief of
Haval Operations, that in the initial implementation of MEC for
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equipments already Installed In the fleet, the -EC of the parte
will carry the MEG of the parent equipment or component,
simplified the problem considerably.
It Is not the purpose of this paper to present a
detailed recommendation for implementation of the concept, but
rather to point a direction which should be taken to improve
the efficiency of supply management afloat. To this degree,
then, the type commander should utilise the business machine
equipments available to his forces during their supply overhaul
to perform an analysis of dollar usage. This can quite simply
be accomplished as a by-product of other effort that is already
required of the crew in processing the off-loaded inventory.
Specifically, usage Is gathered into £AM card form, and some
type of usage analysis is made, ostensibly by the inventory
control points with the idea of improving allowance lists. The
type commander, however, is more interested in the
effectiveness of each individual ship, rather than the allowance
list for one particular component. He can, therefore, take the
information that is developed by equipments and perform an A-
3-C dollar value analysis, as well as a MKC structuring.
In quantifying working stocks it should be noted that
6 has no effect; the primary Ingredients are annual demand,
price, reorder costs, and holding costs. The writer firmly
believes that the conoept of economic order quantity (EOQ) has
a definite place in afloat supply management* Kany people,
however, object to this, statins that it is impossible to
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determine the parameters of the decision, particularly that of
holding cost, for the afloat inventory, Generally t these
critics are concerned with the materials handling cost or
storage cost of holding, rather than the such more important
(In an afloat environment) factors of time preference rate and
obsolescence and shelf life. As a matter of fact, 20Q of at
least an Implicit nature, i.e., stating a certain number of
jsonths of supply as an operating level for all items, is used
ln'TOSt instances. The endurance loading concept described in
Chapter II Is an example. Recalling that the important factor
is the ratio of reorder cost to holding cost, it Is not too
difficult to arrive at a realistic ratio, particularly when it
Is recognized that the square root of the ratio is a constant
to be multiplied times the square root of the variables in the
formula. The square root has a saltigating effect on errors of
estimation. Quite obviously, because of the enormous fund
restraint on the type commander, his holding cost will be high,
which will tend to lower the ratio* Commensurately , the effort
of reloading storerooms through vertical hatches souse six or
sore decks &®&p Implies a need for less frequent ordering than
sight otherwise be feasible ashore.
The point Is made frequently that the lack of operating
funds causes Inventories to be reduced to practically nothing*
The writer disagree® with this? items with usage history will
continue to be used in the future* If these items are not
replenished, the ship soon finds itself with equipments out of

103
commission, an unacceptable state that any commandins officer
or type commander would reject. Perhaps some insurance items
are let drop from the inventory, but these are generally low
essentiality items, in any event, the stock records of the
shipboard supply manager must show a reorder quantity or level
to which to reorder (the same thing) when a reorder point is
reached. The type commander has the ability, during supply
overhaul, to project demand history, expressed as averages, for
the high and medium usage items, through a computer and compute
BOQs (or the quantity Q used previously in this paper) for each
of the items, and thereby provide more realistic worl'ing stock
levels.
Any effort directed toward application of these ideas
should commence with the high dollar 1 teats that are also highly
essential to the operation of the ship, There are not very many
items which fit both categories. In both cases, however, the
first step is for the performance level index of the various
components and equipments to be described, preferably by the
type commander's staff. That is to say, the percentage of
essentiality should be explicitly stated for the equipments
installed on the ship. This is part of the Military
Essentiality Program and is being accomplished at the present
time.
The first alternative would provide for the high-usage
items falling Into the highest MEC, i.e., lOOjf essential to the
operation of the ship, being selected out, ISOQs would be
calculated, then protection levels would be calculated or
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computed by varying the shortage cost, until the desired level
of protection is obtained. This Is the only variable to be
manipulated at this point, for the reorder cost and holding cost
have already been stated In the computation of working stocks.
The estimation of the shortage cost is not difficult, for the
type commanders and commanding officer of each ship should be
able to state explicitly what level of protection he demands
from the shipboard Inventory for the highest KSO class, If for
no other class. From that point It Is a relatively easy matter
to put all the cards in the computer, modify the shortage cost
used for the highest (of 100$) essential material by the
percentage of essentiality that each other item carries, tor
example, If $5,000 were used as the shortage cost, an Item with
101 essentiality would have a shortage cost of £500 used in
computing its protection level. Then an allowance of order
quantities and order points for each ship undergoing supply
overhaul ean be computed. It should be noted that this
calculation of Q and I should include all items with usage,
regardless of what quantity of stooge may be on hand at that
time, :tocks on hand merely serve to reduce the overall cost;
they do not affect the requirements,
After this has tiQen accomplished, and the items with
anticipated usage have been protected, it is necessary to loo-*
at the items on the C03AL which do not reflect usage on stock
records, but which for some reason or othar, are missing from
the inventory. These are Insurance items— those that should be
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carried because of the effects of their failure upon the
operation of the ship. Using the same information in the stock
records, i.e., unit price and allowance quantity, plus the
essentiality coding* the items can bo structured into a
weighted hierarchy of essentiality per dollar, at the same time
keeping a record of cumulative cost. At some point in the
structure the funding authority (type commander) can cut off
the filling of deficiencies with the knowledge of to what degree
he has protected the performance level of the particular ship.
From experience it haB been noted that many items
regain on allowance lists when they have had no usage over a
long period of time? these items are rerlly not essential to
the performance of the ship. By using the stethocl described,
not only can essential shortages be filled, but also many non-
essential items can be deleted, ibis seems to be an obvious
objective of the Military Essentiality Program itself.
The other alternative In computing stoo's levels is to
use the computer in a more holistic manner. Instead of setting
a protection level for the highest MEG, after computation of
working stocks, and structuring shortage costs as a degree of
essentiality from that starting point, all items are considered
as simultaneously competing for funds, both for working stocks
and protection level stocks, somewhat .in the same manner as
the Optimum C03AL for the ?$H program
.
This is accomplished by the use of the Konte Carlo
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simulation techniques described previously.* This would entail
projecting random demand simulations against stock levels
computed by the use of various parameter constants, primarily
the shortage cost. In this respect, the shortage cost would be
a basic shortage cost and would be modified for each item as a
funotion of essentiality in the saise aanner as described above.
The result of this operation is to construct a coat-
effectiveness curve as in figure 9« The cost, of course, would
be total costs. This would s*ve the type commander a much
better prognosis of the results of his decision, and would
enable him to make a better selection based on the funds
available. The selection made determines the basic shortage
cost,
A by-product of either of the alternatives used is to
record the parameters of the decisions that were used. This is
by far one of the biggest problems faced today in revising
allowance lists; the basis for the original decision is not
known. In the case of actual demand for a particular part, it
is difficult to tell sometimes whether demand is random or is a
matter of actually changing demand trends, $y recording the
parameters of the decisions, the individual ship Supply Officer
will be able to revise his o iteck levels after the ship
leaves the supply overhaul, as inputs change
•
Type commander participation in development of stock




standardization of procedures. The primary benefit to be
derived from his participation, however, is that it will provide
a structured decision-making rationale for determining stock
levels to be maintained within the funding constraints that are
so inherent in our operations. A discussion of Implementation
problems from the shipboard level will provide a better insight
into the quantification of parameters.
From the point of view of the individual Supply Officer
of a ship, scientific inventory management techniques offer
certain advantages. The basic advantage is in the optimisation
of OPTAR funds to provide consistent policies in protection
levels and In freeing the Supply Officer to give attention to
the mors Important problems of the department. The use of
these techniques afloat is not new.
U33 Hancock Kodel
Probably the original implementation afloat was aboard
the OSS Hancock (CVA-19) by Commander Hunter w. Stewart, BC,
United States Navy, a former instructor at the Kavy Management
School, Konterey, California. 1 His introduction of the concept
provided certain ground rules for his storekeeper© in
determining the amount of material to reorder and at what point
to submit the reorder. The rules are simple, and are
illustrative of the ease with which even minimal application
of scientific inventory management can be accomplished in the
*U.3., Department of the Navy, BSS Hancock (CVA-19)
»
-1 Division Instruction 4440.2 . 23 September, 1959.
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float to obtain consistent policies in the use of inventory
funds
.
The reorder quantity was expressed in terms of a table
with five points of entry expressed as annual usage by money
value. The results were expressed In terms of months of supply
to order. It should be noted that the EOQ formula expressed in
this paper is a classic one, and it oan be expressed as units,
as in this case, months of supply, or money value of
procurement. Analysis of the Hancock table reveals that it
used an order coat of #10.00 and a holding coat (including all
the factors of holding cost) of 20 <•
The reorder point was based on the concept advanced
by Whltin,* in that a Poisson probability distribution was
used, and a standard safety level in terms of amount of
protection was used for all items in the inventory. This was
accomplished by using the normal approximation to the Poisson
distribution, in that to arrive at the protection level of 99$ t
as was desired, the square root of mean demand times leadtlme
was multiplied by 2,4. The square root of mean demand during
leadtlme, of course, is the Poisson expression of one standard
deviation from the &ean. 2,4 standard deviations under the
normal probability distribution accounts for k9% of the
expected occurrences; this plus the 50 f accounted for as equal
to and less than the average gives the desired 99%.






that only two leadtimea were used, A one-month leadtlme was
used for all Items appearing on the Fleet Issue Load List, and
therefore available from underway replenishments, whloh are
soheduled at roughly thirty-day Intervals for ships operating
with the deployed fleets. Items not on the Fleet Issue Load
List were given a three-month leadtime. This Is considered to
be extremely rational, and It is a point of view that the
writer found valid In his own experience. It does much toward
formalising the endurance period expected from ships of the
fleet in terms of the functions of inventory: how much to
order and when to order it,
A deficiency in the approach, although not an
irrsRsdial one, is that it does not consider the concept of
military essentiality. This is expected, since it was put into
effect before the idea of military essentiality was fully
understood, and before much had \m&n published on the subject.
Even using this system, however, it is possible for a Supply
Officer of a ship to select different protection levels for
different items, based on MEC, and to use the number of
standard deviations required to give him that protection level.
This can be effected quite simply, without the use of any
tables of probability distributions, except for a knowledge of
the area under the normal probability curve described by any




The writer applied the concepts of EOQ, variable
protection levels, and military essentiality during a recent
tour of duty as Supply Officer of the guided missile frigate
Goonta 9). This tour of duty covered the period of pre-
commissioning through the first two years of the shlp , s
service with the fleet.
The need for the concept, In fact, was brought home
dramatically. In commissioning the ship It was discovered that
the new missile equipments, particularly the fire control
system, which were the first installed In the fleet, had not
been fully provisioned with spare parts, nor had complete
allowance lists been developed and furnished to the ship.
After many frantic telephone calls and radio messages to obtain
non-allowance list parts to repair equipment failures, It was
obvious that these parts should be stocked on board. This was
no different from any other ship developing repetitive
requirements for non-allowance list items, except for the
magnitude of the problem, and the importance of the parts to
the operational readiness of the ship. :any of the Items were
considered 100^ essential, I.e., the lack of the parts required
the return of the ship to port.
In view of this problem, some method was needed on
which to base a policy for procuring and stocking these parts.
Fortunately, the circular slide rule developed for the Bureau
of Supplies and Accounts was available, and the writer was
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experienced In Its concept. ' implementation of the concept of
scientific inventory management through this medium, which
automatically solved the formulas for Q, and R t was largely a
matter of trial and error la its initial stages. Because the
ship was new, demand history reflected the initial breaking- in
period of high demands; therefore, progress had to be slow,
particularly since the negative binomial probability
distribution in the slide rule allows for the extreme
fluctuations in demand that are inherent in military
inventories. It did not ta&e Ions, however, for the features
of inventory as described and discussed In this paper to be
evidenced. The A-8-C concept of monetary usage was apparent,
as was the fact that a small percentage of the items were of
extremely high military worth, Of 36,000 items stocked,
approximately only 5,000 had usage in a two-year period; and
of these, only about 1,000 could be considered as true
repetitive demand type items. Even these 1,000 broke down
into an A-B-C relationship, as regards use of funds.
Of primary concern in implementing these procedures
was the constraint of fund limitations. The OPTAR was provided
for operations—for daily maintenance requirements. There was
not much left for establishing stock levels for new items.
3ecause of this, and in ^rUes- to provide for inaccurate
prognosticat ions made from limited experience, the holding cost
was set at 100$. fait accounted for not only a high time
' Clark, Karr, and VanderVeer, op. cit .
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preference rate (50$), but also provided for a high
obsolescence rate (50$), expected from changes in the allowance
lists (deletions) because of design changes in the equipments.
>reas a normal ship receives a new C03AL once each two years
as part of supply overhaul, the USB Goontz received four
ordnance and four electronic COSALs and three ship's parts
allowance lists during the first year in the fleet. This in
itself involved a high degree of stock handling apart from the
day-to-day operations, ihe holding cost was varied on
Individual items, particularly those with short shelf life or
higher obsolescence.
The reorder cost was established at '* 10*00, even though
,3t storerooms were somewhat inaccessible. This was an
intuitive judgment based on the writer's experience at the
IJaval Ordnance supply office, where the order cost was
originally put at v75.00. An order on board ship did not
involve any technical do cussentat ion or contract negotiation;
it was primarily just typing a requisition from a stock record.
In addition, the labor cost of a sailor is seueh less than that
of the civil service. Preeiseneas in parameter estimation was
not a goal; it was recognised froai the beginning that errors
in estimating either order coat or holding cost were modified
by the fact that the results were a function of the square root
of the ratio of the two.
Tho biggest problem was estimation of the shortage
coKt* This was strictly a trial and error operation, but
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interestingly enough, as time progressed one figure kept
appearing for most of the high essentiality items that also had
repetitive demand. This was $S t OO0,. although on some highly
essential Items a higher shortage cost was used. The setting
of this parameter was based primarily on intuition from having
worked with the concept, hut also the allowance list provided a
certain guide as to whether demands for the items included
therein were random fluctuation or valid differences from the
allowance list estimation of demand. One aspect of the
intuitive judgment was having a "feel" for the amount of stock
that would be required to be on hand during leadtlse, considering
the variations that were possible both In demand and leadtime.
In developing the shortage cost principle for determining
consistent protection levels, the writer had not learned the
concept of performance levels as an expression of operational
readiness. Therefore, more intuitive approaches to military
essentiality were used. The concept of military essentiality
was used and was expressed in terms of a to tOOI' scale. The
basic shortage cost was set at #5,000 for those Items considered
as IQQ0 essential to the operation of the ship and not
susceptible to redundancy, cannibal!sat ion, or Jury-rigging,
These consisted of many parts applicable to the missile system
(missile, launcher, fire control), as well as parts applicable
to certain parts of the ship propulsion equipment, iome other
items with high, but not the highest essentiality, used on these
two system areas were assigned shortage costs of | 2,000 and
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*M,OOQ# All other parte applying to the hull, machinery, and
electrical systems, as well as missile fire control, were
assigned a $500 shortage coat. This was done because items
could not oe segregated for Individual study under the condition*.
ler which the ship was operating, &&d it was considered that
a "broad brush" could be applied, 03t consumable supplies,
3uch ^a housekeeping or cleaning supplies, were assigned a
shortage cost t , and office supplies and other really non-
essential supplies wore assigned a shortage cost of 5. primarily
because of nuisance coat of being out of stock* Conceptually,
this can be at&tejd as a shortage cost of *5.00 x I0n , where n
is the essentiality of the item expressed as 0, 1, 2, 3, etc.
Leadtimes for uae in the :?:sodel were the same as used
in the uicock modal with one small exception. Experience
indicated that three months was a realistic approximation of
leadtlir.s for an item carried in the supply syatea, but not on
the Fleet Issue Load List. *ith regard to the latter category
of lte&s, experience la the united Jtatea seventh Fleet
indicated that a thirty-day re-sijtpply could not always be
expected; therefore, as a safety factor, a two-^onth leadtime
was used for ita$3 on the Fleet Issue Load List. In addition,
items with -mown proeure&ant difficulties were revised upward.
Saae of lap Iassentation of this method was as simple as
that experienced In Hancoex. A non-rated seaman with
relatively little experience la oupply management was trained
to use the slid© rule In a period of a week* Admittedly,
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certain restrictions were necessary, but for most items broad
guidelines were sufficient.
Certain of the classical results of scientific inventory
management were observed. Of primary importance was the fact
that in the case of low cost, yet highly essential items, it
was possible to buy a large degree of protection with a small
investment of funds, more than allowed by the allowance list.
This was particularly true in the case of low cost electron
tubes, which also experienced high usage. At the same time
that a high protection level was being set for these items the
EOQ function was setting less frequent order Intervals, so that
it was possible to devote much more attention to the highly
expensive/highly essential items. This type of lt*& was
usually reordered each time it was used, and because of the high
cost the protection level was less than on other high KSQ type
items. This was compensated for by more individual attention.
There were about twenty items that the Supply Officer exercised
personal supervision on their supply management. The high
holding cost parameter not only required more frequent re-
procurement of high cost items, but at this time these items
were also reviewed to determine the validity of the parameter
quantifications used in originally establishing order quantities
and reorder points.
Certain items were immediately segregated as not being
susceptible to scientific inventory management without much
introspection. These were the large foully items, such as wiping
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rags, soap powder, paint (whloh required inflammable stowage),
toilet paper, mineograph paper, etc. There were about ten
different items. On these, the holding cost was raised to 4
and in a oouple of instances, to 1,000$. These figures may
appear to be artificially large, but the very fact that they
were used in fitting requirements to available space Indicates
that the decision was structured, and that the available space
could be traded off against the importance of the item and
probable risk of stockout implied by any particular decision.
From this the conclusion was reached that storage space is not
a prohibitive factor in stocking material aboard ship, only a
very few of the many Items carried cause any space problem.
These can be isolated and given separate management attention.
The purpose of scientific inventory management is to assist the
inventory manager to make his decisions, not to substitute a
formula for managerial Judgment.
i\ is to this point that this thesis has been directed.
A concept exists which provides the Supply Officer of the
individual ship with the ability to structure his decisions
regarding Inventory management, and thereby make more accurate,
more consistent decisions. It gives him the ability to trade
off supply effectiveness in support of the equipment® in his
ship with the funds provided for maintenance of the ship. He
can equate his decisions in terms of the operational readiness
of his ship.
Implementation is simple. The firBt step is to analyse
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the inventory In terms of dollar value of Issues and In terms
of military essentiality. The items consuming the majority of
funds, and al»o having alga essentiality should be separated
for special management attention and analysis. These are the
items, few in number, where scientific inventory management
techniques will pay lar&e dividends.
Parameter quantification can be accomplished fairly
easily, order cost can be safely established at 110* Holding
cost should be put fairly high in the initial Implementation
stages in order to Minimise the degree of error, economic order
quantities can then be calculated for a sample of the items
selected for special attention, from this point protection
levels, as an element of the reorder point, ,», oan be computed
until a shortage cost is determined for the highest
essentiality items. The next step is to obtain the assistance
of the technical or line personnel of the ship in determining
the essentiality of the high usage value items in terms of
performance level of the equipments. With this information
other shortage costs oan be specified for the items of lesser
essentiality as a function of the percentage essentiality times
the basic shortage cost calculated for the highest essentiality
items. As items decrease in importance It is possible to give
less attention to the precisenees of parameter estimation, and
to use generalized quant if 1cat ion®. The major advantage of




1th the parameters quantified, the only thing remaining
i» to seleot a type of probability distribution. The most
effective method, and simplest, is use of the circular slide
rule described, 1 If it is not available the Poisson
probability distribution provides the most flexibility with the
least inowled^e of mathematics or statistics. The Important
factor In use of any probability distribution is to determine
the protection level considering relative military essentiality
of the items and order frequency per year.
Although each individual Supply Officer afloat la
responsible for the dally management of his inventories, he
does not and should not operate In a vacuum, type commanders
have more to realize froia the advantages of scientific Inventory
management, and they should adopt the techniques and assist the
ships of their forces to implement them. Through using these
techniques during the supply overhaul program each type
commander can develop parameter values for force-wide use, as
well as deviations for each ship. Parameter preciseness Is no
snore essential in this respect than in any other inventory
management environment. Adoption of the concept will provide
immediate benefits in a more realistic treatment of the three
aspects of supply management; cost of ordering stocks, oosts






Implementation of these techniques la directed toward
Baking the oest decision possible on the items experiencing
repetitive demands, i.e., the ones consuming the funds available
for operation of the fleet. These decisions will require less
emphasis on low cost/low essentiality items, and will free the
apply Officer to devote his efforts to more effective
management of high cost and high essentiality material.

CHAPTER VI
Technological developments of equipments Installed In
the ships of the United states Havy, since &orld War II, have
Increased the complexity of the problems facing the afloat
inventory manager. In spite of these complexities, which far
surpass those of the civilian inventory, certain analogies can
be drawn between civilian inventory management and management
of military inventories, both ashore and afloat.
The purpose of inventories is universally one of buying
time. They serve to de-couple the end user from the
distribution system required to transmit needed materials from
manufacturer to the end user. This is of particular Importance
to ships, for the capability of the Navy to perform its mission
in defense of our country is dependent upon its ability to be
mobile—to refrain from an absolute dependence on the shore
logistics complex, la effect the time that is bought through
this de- coupling of dependence on a distribution system is more
ready time for weapon systems. This ready time can be measured
in terms of operational readiness of the ship— Its ability to
perforsj assigned missions.
The problems of inventory management can be generalized




functions of Inventory (how much to ouy and when to buy It).
The functions of inventory are the ones that usually occupy
the inventory managers attention, for they are concerned with
the dynamics of inventories. An analysis of these functions
reveals that stock levels consist of working stocks and safety
stools, Further analysis of inventories reveals that a small
percentage of the items accounts for an overwhelming majority of
the dollar demand for the whole Inventory, and conversely, the
majority of the items accounts for only a small percentage of
sales. military inventories are confounded by a further
problem: most items in the inventories feature low issue rates,
yet are subject to extreme fluctuations.
Since World War II, the concept of scientific inventory
control, as an outgrowth of statistical decision theory used so
extensively during the war, has made great advances in Its
applications to industrial inventories. These techniques have
been adopted for use in shore-based military inventories.
Progress in implementation of scientific inventory management
techniques has been slow. This is due primarily to the fact
that most writings on the subject by practitioners of the art
(or science, as the case may be) are usually expressed in
complex mathematical terms not readily understandable by the
non- initiated, the operational personnel who must implement and
maintain any inventory management system. Actually, the concept
is relatively simple, and with the advent of electronic
computing equipment there is no reason why more immediate
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impl©mentation ia not made throughout Inventory systems, be
they civilian or military. The possibilities of electronic
simulation of the results of decisions are enormous, and they
provide an ability to test decisions before implementation.
The concept of scientific inventory control, as in any
application of statistical decision theory, requires an explicit
consideration or quantification of the interrelationship of the
various parameters or inputs involved in an Inventory decision.
It revolves around that branch of economic decision theory
which allows a trade-off of different costs Involved in
inventory management: the costs of procuring and receiving
material; the costs of holding material In store; and the
implied penalties arising of not having inventories when they
are needed. This approach finds a receptive climate in the
Department of Defense at the present time. Particular attention
has been given by the hierarchy of management of our armed
forces to this economic analysis approaoh of considering
alternative decisions arising from trade-offs and the
effectiveness of effort as a function of the cost of that
effort.
Aboard ships of the Navy the measurement of operational
effectiveness or readiness Is vital, fhle measurement has been
translated into the supply management area through the concept
of military essentiality coding. This concept has h&en under
study for many years, the results of the study provide the
inventory manager afloat with the ability to analyze his
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inventory in terms of the importance of the different items to
the Rise Ion of the ship and to introduce variable stock level
decisions.
ilitary essentiality is translated into an implied
shortage penalty for the ship, due to the failure of different
equipments. Through it, a realistic inventory protection level
can be ascertained for each item aboard ship; however, it is
not necessary that each item be rigorously examined to
accomplish this. The small percentage of items constituting the
largest percentage of dollar issues provides an area of analysis
and application of scientific inventory management techniques
where benefits of the greatest magnitude will be obtained.
Through the Introduction of consistent inventory management
policies the Supply Officer afloat is able to make better use
of his personnel and time through economic ordering principles,
and at the same time optimize the use of funds in protecting
against etookouts during leadtime by stocking larger quantities
of the low cost items and devoting more personal attention to
the high cost items. These consistent polioies require any
Inventory manager explicitly to consider the interrelationship
of the factors of his decision,
clentific inventory management techniques have been
used successfully aboard ships of the United states :^avy. Some
have been informal in their Introduction, but others,
particularly the Optimum COSAL Program, developed for use in the
Polaris program, are fully structured and programmed on
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electronic data processing equipment. However, the need la
apparent for further Implementation of the concepts Involved,
Typo commanders In the Navy will receive benefits through the
application of these techniques during the supply overhauls
that each ship undergoes periodically. Individual shipboard
Supply Officers will benefit In their daily inventory
management problems. Whatever means of implementation are
selected should be done so in a method susceptible to dally use
by personnel not trained in statistics or mathematics. Training
of personnel in the concepts should be Instituted in the Havy
Supply Corps School before officers are assigned to the fleet.
There is no reason why such a useful tool for consistent
structured decision-making should not be applied to the
shipboard inventory management problem. The major deterrent is
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